By AudraFerguson-Allen
Imagine that you just completed a deposition. It was brilliant. The witness (the opposing party) admitted to all the key
facts necessary for your summary judgment motion. On your way back to the office, you call the client to tell her the good
news. The summary judgment motion in federal court is going to be a slam dunk, assuming the transcript reads as well as you
remember. As luck would have it, it does. You file your motion for summary judgment. A couple of weeks later, the errata sheet
arrives at your office. Not surprisingly, it contains spelling corrections and name corrections. However, you are shocked
when the errata sheet also contains substantive changes along with lengthy explanations for several of the key responses.
Rather than the key admissions, the witness has now tempered all his answers and even blatantly changed others. Your mind
races to your beautifully written summary judgment motion. Can a deponent do this?
Not in the Indiana federal district courts. Although there is split among the federal circuits, the Seventh Circuit takes
a “middle ground approach” and the Indiana district courts, applying that approach, have disallowed the “take
home exam” theory of errata sheets, which can be particularly troublesome at the summary judgment stage.
The Rule – FRCP 30(e)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e)(1) provides as follows:
On request by the deponent or a party before the deposition is completed, the deponent must be allowed 30 days after being
notified by the officer that the transcript or recording is available in which:
(A) to review the transcript or recording; and
(B) if there are changes in form or substance, to sign a statement listing the changes and the reasons for making them.
The Federal Courts Split in the Interpretation of FRCP 30
The decisions from the federal courts regarding the use of errata sheets are inconsistent and range from allowing
any substantive changes to allowing only perfunctory changes. For instance, some federal courts allow a deponent to freely
make any changes to the deposition transcript and will not second-guess the legitimacy of the change. See Reilly v. TXU
Corp., 230 F.R.D. 486, 489 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (adopting a broad-view interpretation). To avoid potential abuse from such
a liberal approach, most of those courts require that the original transcript and the modified transcript be maintained as
part of the record. Id. at 490. This allows a jury to see both the original transcript and the modified transcript.
The problem with this approach occurs at the dispositive motion stage. The testimony is no longer an unequivocal admission
but rather creates a material issue of fact. This approach has been adopted by courts in the Second Circuit. See In re
Probate Proceeding Will of Mancuso, 764 N.Y.S.2d 800, 804-805 (N.Y. Sur. 2003) (stating that where there is a dispute
about whether a transcript is correct, the issue should go to the trier of fact). Accordingly, the change has destroyed your
motion for summary judgment.
At the other end of the spectrum, courts, recognizing the gather-and-preserve function of depositions, allow no
substantive changes to a deposition transcript. Instead, only transcriptional errors may be corrected through an errata sheet.
See Greenway v. International Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992). This approach (more or less) has been
adopted by courts in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
The Seventh Circuit Takes a Middle Ground Approach
In the Seventh Circuit, summary judgment cannot be defeated by submission of conflicting, postdeposition affidavits.
Piscione v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 171 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1999). However, can a party get around this prohibition
by submitting an errata sheet “correcting” or “explaining” unfavorable testimony?
To some extent yes, as a deponent may change his deposition from what he said to what he meant to say. Thorn v. Sundstrand
Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2000). However, while broad on its face, this permission is limited such
that “a change in substance which actually contradicts the transcript is impermissible unless it can plausibly be represented
as the correction of an error in transcription, such as dropping a ‘not.’” Id. Despite this admonition,
as discussed below, various litigants have argued (to little avail) that Thorn permits broad, substantive changes
through use of errata sheets.
Indiana District Courts Do Not Allow Deponents to Use Errata Sheets to “Undo” Testimony
Indiana district courts have had an opportunity to rule on whether an errata sheet may be used to alter a deponent’s
substantive testimony. The district courts have uniformly held that an errata sheet may not be used to alter unfavorable testimony
to create an issue of fact. Some examples follow here.
Judge Larry J. McKinney, in the Southern District of Indiana, struck an errata sheet that contained changes that the court
considered “really no more than ‘lawyers’ statements,’ attempting to deflect potentially detrimental
testimony.” During a deposition, a 30(b)(6) deponent testified that shareholders incurred the loss. The errata sheet,
however, drastically changed the deponent’s testimony to state that the company, not the shareholders, incurred the
loss. Paul Harris Stores, Inc. v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, No. 1:02-cv-1014, 2006 WL 2644935 (S.D. Ind. Sept.
14, 2006). The court refused to allow the “substantive” change to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Judge Sarah Evans Barker also refused to allow errata sheet changes that sought to “undo” unfavorable testimony.
Again, a deponent attempted to change the deposition testimony of a company’s 30(b)(6) witness regarding the types of
damage that may constitute “property damage.” As often happens, the witness seeking to make the change argued
that the errata sheet was merely submitted to clarify an answer to an ambiguous question. Judge Barker disagreed and found
that the deponent was actually seeking to change the company’s testimony. Trinity Homes LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.,
No. 1:04-cv-1920, 2009 WL 3163108 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 25, 2009). Accordingly, the “clarified answer” could not be
used to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
In a recent opinion issued by the Northern District of Indiana, the court, refusing to allow broad substantive changes to
the plaintiff’s testimony via an errata sheet, explained the types of changes allowed in the Seventh Circuit. Treat
v. Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., Civ. No. 1:08-cv-173, 2010 WL 1779911, at *6-8 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 30, 2010). The
plaintiff had made various employment claims against her previous employer. During her deposition, she was asked, “Did
you ever go to the dealership and set up an appointment [with Mr. Kelley].” Plaintiff responded, “No.” In
her errata sheet, plaintiff sought to unilaterally expand upon this answer by changing her testimony to reflect the following
answer:
However, I did call Gary Patterson and conferenced in Mr. Kelley’s assistant on the phone, Maureen Klausen and we discussed
all the issues I had. Gary Patterson called me back at a later date and told me that Mr. Kelley would not change the decision
to fire me based on my complaints. I did try to contact Mr. Kelley several times after that by telephone, and would leave
messages.
Plaintiff also sought to change her response to the question why she was paid less than she thought she deserved. In her
deposition, the plaintiff responded that she was paid less money so her manager could make more money. Again, the plaintiff’s
errata sheet sought to drastically change her deposition response to the following:
I think he also did this because Mr. Henderson wanted me to look bad so that I could take the fall for his mistakes. The
majority of the outstanding contracts in transit were due to contracts he entered without obtaining all the necessary information
and providing the car on the spot. The majority of the contracts he entered took over 7 days. I feel he probably knew he could
pin me for his mistakes and pay me less than my pay plan, and no one at Kelley would question him. I think Mr. Henderson wanted
to pay me less because he didn’t want to share his pay equally with a woman, that he felt he was superior to me and
did not have to treat me fairly or equally.
Not surprisingly, the defendant argued that the newly expanded responses via errata sheet were impermissible and sought to
strike the errata sheet. Citing Thorn, the plaintiff argued that the Seventh Circuit allows substantive changes and
the only remedy is to retain the original transcript for the jury. In granting the motion to strike, the court resurrected
the limiting language in Thorn that permits only a change which “can plausibly be represented as the correction
of an error in transcription, such as dropping a ‘not.’” Moreover, the court noted that plaintiff failed
to provide any reasons to support the errata sheet changes. Treat v. Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., Civ., 2010
WL 1779911 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 30, 2010).
In Effect, Indiana District Courts Will Not Allow a Deposition to Transform into a “Take-Home Exam”
Although it has been argued that the Seventh Circuit allows substantive changes in errata sheets, the Indiana district
courts refuse to allow errata sheet changes to “undo” the original, substantive testimony. Instead, Indiana follows
a middle-ground approach and disallows errata sheet changes to contradict deposition testimony. At the summary judgment stage,
a middle-ground approach seeks to avoid unfair “surprise” when an opposition to summary judgment is accompanied
with an errata sheet containing substantive changes. By allowing only changes based on mistakes in transcription (or perhaps
inadvertent slips of the tongue), the Indiana district courts avoid the “take home examination” results that could
ensue from broad substantive changes. If this were not the case, a witness (or, more likely, the attorney) could answer the
deposition questions with little preparation and “then return home and plan artful responses.” See Greenway,
144 F.R.D. at 323. Interpreting Rule 30(e) broadly actually discourages truthfulness. Depositions would have very little
meaning and effect (but would rather merge with the interrogatory device) if the witness could change answers with the assistance
of counsel and upon further reflection. Indiana district courts seem to realize the potential issues and limit those changes
to errors in transcription and those errors that do not contradict the deposition testimony.
Practical Tips
If you receive an errata sheet, confirm that it is received timely. Courts strictly enforce the thirty-day requirement
noting that it prevents abuse and surprise. Bullock-Banks v. Indiana Am. Water Co., No. 1:03-cv-1459, 2005 WL 1126839,
at *5 (S.D. Ind. May 12, 2005) (granting defendant’s motion to disallow the untimely errata sheet changes). Errata sheets
submitted after thirty days cannot be used as evidence. Id. Also, review the errata sheet and ensure that all changes
are accompanied by a “statement of reasons for making them.” Id. A reason must be stated, although the
reason “need not be convincing.” Duff v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., 926 F. Supp. 799, 803-804 (N.D. Ind.
1996). The court will strike an errata sheet that fails to provide a reason for the changes.
If you are the party submitting an errata sheet, think strategically about whether the change should be submitted. A change
may actually draw attention to a weak area. The Seventh Circuit noted that “an attempt to change the substance may actually
backfire by turning the opposing party’s attention to a passage that would otherwise have been dismissed by the trier
of fact as terminally muddled.” Thorn, 207 F.3d at 389.
Finally, avoid the potential for prejudice by scheduling the depositions several months before the summary judgment deadline.
All too often, depositions are scheduled on the eve of the dispositive motion deadline. This leaves no choice but to file
a summary judgment motion before the thirty-day period in which to file the errata sheet has elapsed. Thus, a party is left
in the vulnerable position of having to file a summary judgment motion with the chance that an errata sheet will be used as
an exhibit in opposing summary judgment. If depositions are scheduled well in advance of summary judgment, the parties can
know all the changes and potential problems before filing the motion for summary judgment.
As always, if you are practicing in other jurisdictions, check the local rules and precedent.•
____________
Ms. Ferguson-Allen is an associate in the Indianapolis office of IceMiller and is a member of the DTCI’s Trial Tactics Section. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.














Qualified immunity, means that if you wear a badge, you are exempt from law and free to do anything you please! The courts will back badge toting individuals, because they think they are above the law as well. They think, they have judicial immunity, they do not.
Deeply, deeply concerned? I'll bet if it was the judge's money that had been swindled we'd see deep concern with actual consequences. First a Ponzi scheme, then a shell game with the assets…c'mon, hasn't Conour abused the judicial system and his clients long enough? I say enough already.
Wow, just wow.
Forcing a defendant to wear a stun belt, in court or otherwise, is a violation of american principles! It is also unconstitutional!
So, if I save $100.00 cash per week, from my $500.00 per week paycheck, for 50 years, at which time, I will have saved $260,000.00, the government can raid my home and take my money, just by saying it is drug money! Shouldn't the government, have some kind of evidence of drugs, rather, than just saying we are the government and we will take anything you own, anytime we choose? Tyranny is upon us! If you don't know your rights, you don't have any!