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Farming dispute creates first impression issue

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In a ruling from the Indiana Supreme Court on an issue of first impression, two of the state's five justices fear a new holding will have far-reaching impact not only on the forfeiture cases at issue, but also mortgage foreclosure cases impacting the commercial and industrial real estate world.

Justices issued a ruling Thursday in Keith Myers v. Wesley C. Leedy, No. 85S02-0808-CV-478, unanimously granting transfer and agreeing in result, but disagreeing on the scope of the ruling issued by the court.

Deciding a Wabash County case, the justices held that a tenant's leasehold interest in a forfeiture action survives when a land contract vendor files suit and knows or should have known that the tenant has possession of the property. Unless of course, that tenant is made a party to pending litigation.

While all five agreed with the end result, Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard and Justice Frank Sullivan issued a concurring opinion that said the majority went too far in issuing a rule that impacts not only forfeiture cases, but also mortgage cases, and the court shouldn't have used this case to "alter the property interests of owners and lenders in billions of dollars of commercial and industrial real estate."

The case involves 200 acres of Fulton County farmland, which Eli John Yoder was buying from Keith Myers in installments. The land included crops that Yoder was supposed to own as soon as the crops came in for the season. Of that total acreage, about 160 acres were tillable soil and Myers then entered a lease agreement with Wesley Leedy to get $100 per acre for the land Leedy was farming. But in late 2004, Myers filed a complaint against Yoder for a breach of the original land sale contract; Leedy wasn't a party to that action. Settlement agreements didn't materialize and Leedy continued farming the property for the 2005 season and the early part of 2006.

Yoder was later found in default of that land sale contract, and the trial court decided his forfeiture of any interest in the property was the most appropriate remedy. When Leedy began farming the property following the court ruling in May 2006, Myers ordered him off the property and then rented the property to someone else for $125 an acre. Claiming damages of $36,760, Leedy filed a complaint against Myers for not allowing him to finish his farming - as the agreement with Yoder would have allowed. The trial court later came back with a judgment in Leedy's favor, finding that Yoder had the right to cash rent the real estate prior to the court ruling and that, since Leedy had started planting in March 2006, his interest survived the later ruling in May - he should have been able to finish the season out, the court ruled.

On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision in April 2008 that reversed on grounds the tenancy didn't survive because Leedy had both constructive and actual notice of the breach of contract when he entered into the 2006 lease.

The justices granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, finding that Leedy's property interest wasn't extinguished because he wasn't included in the original breach of land contract action between Myers and Yoder.

But while concurring in result, Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Sullivan disagreed with how far the majority used it to alter the landscape on this issue and even for mortgage foreclosure cases.

"Principles from mortgage foreclosure laws are thus helpful to resolving the present case," the chief justice wrote. "By the same token, the majority makes it quite clear that it intends the legal rule announced in this case to govern future decisions in mortgagor/mortgagee cases, a vastly larger and more complex part of the state's economy."

He continued, "Importing the open-ended idea of equity into the complicated, largely statutory system which governs the massive interests of commercial real estate mortgages, applying it to past and present financial commitments, and declaring that all subordinate unrecorded or informal possessors survive unaffected by foreclosure unless the lender undertakes to obtain service of process on all of them is really quite remarkable.

"I perceive that today's ruling is not really consonant with prevailing national doctrine on mortgages, but would put off that debate until such moment as we might have before us parties like mortgage lenders and owner/mortgagors of apartment buildings, shopping centers, or other commercial or industrial real estate whose world is being altered by today's declaration."

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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