ILNews

Federal appeals court examines disputed telephone charges

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Writing for a unanimous 7th Circuit Court of Appeals panel, U.S. Judge David Hamilton authored an opinion Tuesday full of what he calls “telephonese.” The opinion delves into a small business’s disputed phone bill charges and how those matters are governed by state and common law.

The ruling comes in Lady Di’s Inc. v. Enhanced Services Billing Inc. and ILD Telecommunications Inc., No. 10-3903, a case from U.S. Judge Sarah Evans Barker in the Southern District of Indiana involving an Indianapolis beauty and hair salon.

Using AT&T as its telephone company, Lady Di’s disputes charges that were on its telephone bill in 2008 from ESBI in Delaware and ILD in Delaware – both described as “billing aggregators” that are not directly involved with the sale of telecommunications and services to customers but act as intermediaries between telephone companies such as AT&T and service providers offering e-fax services or Internet resources.

After customers pay their telephone bills, ESBI and ILD collect payments for service provider charges recovered by local telephone companies, deduct part of the payment as a fee, and forward the rest to service providers.

In this case, Lady Di’s owners dispute several months of charges in 2008 that they claim were unauthorized for an e-fax service and an Internet search engine and directory option. Lady Di’s made its October payment that year that included the $49.95 and $42.75 charges before discovering the charges, and then contacted AT&T for a refund. AT&T told the business to contact both ESBI and ILD, and the billing aggregators named as defendants here either refused a refund or didn’t respond.

After this suit was filed in state court and later removed to federal court, Lady Di’s account was credited in full for the disputed charges – but the case proceeded on claims that the allegedly unauthorized charges violated Indiana’s anti-cramming statute as well as the Deceptive Consumers Practices Act, and that the amounts were unjust enrichment under common law.

Judge Barker denied a class-certification request and later in separate rulings granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claims of unjust enrichment and statutory deception. Lady Di’s appealed both rulings, and the 7th Circuit panel affirmed the judgment, but the court followed a different path to reach that same conclusion.

“Turning first to the merits, we conclude that the Indiana anti-cramming regulation does not apply to these defendants because they are not telephone companies and did not act in this case as billing agents for telephone companies,” Judge Hamilton wrote.

Although the anti-cramming regulation detailed in both Indiana Code 8-1-29-5(2) and 170 IAC 7-1.1-19 doesn’t provide a private cause of action, Judge Hamilton wrote that it does provide a way to defend against collection actions. The judges also determined that a recorded phone conversation shows that Lady Di’s actually did order the disputed services and that defeats the unjust enrichment and deceptive commercial solicitation claims.

Precedent from state courts during the past century proves that Indiana courts likely wouldn’t agree with the plaintiffs on the unjust enrichment claims, Judge Hamilton wrote.

“We do not believe Indiana courts would use the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment to convert a technical violation of a regulation into a right of action that would provide a (tiny) windfall for an individual customer who actually ordered, received the benefit of, and paid for the services in question,” he wrote.

“If Indiana wants to create a private right of action for a violation of the anti-cramming law, it can do so by statute or perhaps by regulation. It has not done so yet. If a customer is a victim of genuine cramming – charged for unwanted services that were not ordered – the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment might well be applicable. But the doctrine … cannot be used in this way by a customer like plaintiff, who actually ordered and received the services.”
 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

ADVERTISEMENT