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Good-faith exception not applicable

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An Indiana trial court erred when it denied a defendant's motion to suppress evidence because the good-faith exception doesn't apply in this case, the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded today.

In Brea Rice v. State of Indiana, No. 55A04-0902-CR-99, Brea Rice argued the drugs found in her purse after she was arrested on a warrant for receiving stolen property shouldn't be allowed into evidence because the search that led to the warrant wasn't supported by probable cause.

Mooresville Police officers Yarnell and Harris executed a search warrant of the home Rice rented and lived in with Brian Nysewander to find stolen property allegedly stored there. The search didn't turn up any of the missing property, but officers photographed a motorcycle helmet in the garage before leaving. That helmet turned out to be reported stolen, so police filed an affidavit of probable cause to arrest Rice and Nysewander.

Officer Whitley saw Rice at her back door as he drove by and stopped to arrest her because he knew she had a warrant. A search of her purse at the police department turned up two marijuana joints and a small amount of methamphetamine.

Rice was charged with possession of methamphetamine and marijuana. The receiving stolen property charge was later dismissed without prejudice, and Rice filed an interlocutory appeal after the trial court denied her motion to suppress the drug evidence.

The trial court acknowledged the arrest warrant shouldn't haven't been issued but found the police conduct could fall under the good-faith exception. There's no question Whitely acted in good faith in serving the arrest warrant; however, the actions of the officers who originate warrants must also be considered, wrote Judge Margret Robb.

Nothing in the record suggests the affidavit was deliberately misleading or false, but it did fail to show any connection between Rice and the crime of which she was accused, the judge continued.

"If we were to apply the good faith exception in this case and hold it was objectively reasonable for Officer Whitley to rely on a warrant supported by an affidavit wholly lacking probable cause, officers would have no incentive to discover and attest to facts amounting to probable cause in future affidavits, the defendant's right to seek review of the probable cause determination would be empty, and the exclusionary rule would have no meaning," she wrote.

The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement from committing constitutional violations, and evidence should only be suppressed if it can be said the officer had knowledge or may properly be charged with the knowledge the search was unconstitutional. Yarnell may be charged with knowledge that an arrest warrant issued on the basis of his affidavit was unconstitutional, and as in Hensley v. State, 778 N.E.2d 484, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), exclusion can therefore have a deterrent effect by ensuring future affidavits contain sufficient information for a judicial officer to determine probable cause, wrote Judge Robb.

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  1. Wishing Mary Willis only God's best, and superhuman strength, as she attempts to right a ship that too often strays far off course. May she never suffer this personal affect, as some do who attempt to change a broken system: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QojajMsd2nE

  2. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  3. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  4. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  5. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

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