ILNews

Hearing didn't consider all statutory factors

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In a modification of physical custody case, the Indiana Court of Appeals remanded for further proceedings because the trial court was required to hear evidence on and consider all of the factors listed in Indiana Code Section 31-17-2.2-1(b).

In the case In the Matter of the Paternity of J.J., a child born out of wedlock by next friend, Garnet S. v. Wess A.J., No. 08A02-0903-JV-280, mother Garnet S. appealed the trial court modification of physical custody of daughter J.J. to father Wess A.J. after Garnet announced she was moving out of state with her husband.

Garnet had physical custody of J.J. and worked two jobs; Wess didn't pay the court-ordered child support, but he often watched J.J. while Garnet worked and provided clothes, diapers, and other necessities for his daughter. Wess didn't have a job and made money doing odd jobs. The trial court found Wess had parenting time for more than half the year in 2007 and 2008, and because he had been the de facto custodial parent it would be the same as a change of custody. It also found J.J. had a close relationship with her siblings, grandparents, and other relatives and moving to Georgia would have a significant impact upon those relationships.

The trial court modified custody by awarding joint custody to the parents, with Wess having primary physical custody and mother having parenting time.

The Court of Appeals determined the trial court abused its discretion when it considered Wess a "de facto custodian" because there's no evidence he financially supported his daughter, wrote Judge Paul Mathias. The trial court may have been commenting on the relationship of Wess with his daughter, but the court should consider the specific circumstances surrounding that relationship. Wess was J.J.'s primary caregiver largely because he wasn't employed or paying child support and Garnet had to work multiple jobs to support their daughter. She was complying with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines by offering him first refusal to provide child care while working, wrote Judge Mathias.

"Mother should not be penalized for doing what she was obligated to do, especially when Father was not fulfilling all of his obligations. In short, the trial court should consider not only the existing relationship between Father and J.J. but also the circumstances giving rise to that relationship," he wrote.

Because the record in the instant case doesn't show the parties or trial court fully considered or took into account the requisite statutory factors listed in I.C. Section 31-17-2.2-1(b), the case was remanded with instructions to conduct another hearing on Wess' motion to modify custody and to hear evidence on each of the statutory factors. Absent any exigent circumstances, the court shall order the parties to maintain the status quo pending the outcome of a new hearing.

The appellate court also encouraged parties facing issues involving the custody of children to have an attorney help them with litigation. The parents in this case proceeded pro se during the custody hearing.

"Because the court's order has such a profound effect on the lives of the parties and their children, we cannot emphasize enough the importance of presenting sufficient evidence and developing an adequate record," wrote the judge.

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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