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High court grants 4 transfers

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The Indiana Supreme Court agreed Oct. 1 to hear four cases, including one dealing with whether a defendant should have a new murder trial and another involving whether a prior conviction in conspiracy to deal in cocaine counts as a conviction for dealing in cocaine under the state's habitual offender statute.

In Chawknee P. Caruthers v. State of Indiana, No. 46S05-0910-CR-431, the Indiana Court of Appeals split as to whether the trial court committed a fundamental error by failing to investigate the impact of threats made against the jury during a murder trial. The majority concluded the lack of questioning by the trial court of the jurors regarding the threats required the murder conviction be overturned. Judge Ezra Friedlander dissented, agreeing with the state that the harmless error doctrine should apply to defeat Chawknee Caruthers' claim of fundamental error.

In Myron Owens v. State, No. 49S02-0910-CR-429, the appellate court unanimously decided that a prior conviction of conspiracy to deal in cocaine qualified as a conviction for dealing in cocaine under the state's habitual offender statute. The Court of Appeals ruled that in order to have convicted Myron Owens of conspiracy to deal in cocaine, the state had to prove he actually dealt in cocaine, and under these particular facts and circumstances, Owens' prior conviction for conspiracy to commit dealing is, for purposes of Section 8, a prior conviction for dealing in cocaine.

In Luis E. Duran v. State of Indiana, No. 45S03-0910-CR-430, Judge Carr Darden dissented from the majority's denial of a man's motion to suppress evidence because the judge didn't believe the police officers were justified in kicking down Luis Duran's door and entering his apartment. Judges Margret Robb and L. Mark Bailey ruled the officers didn't violate Duran's Fourth Amendment rights or his rights under the Indiana Constitution because the Litchfield factors, in their totality, favored a finding the officers' conduct was reasonable.

Police incorrectly believed another man, who they were looking for on a warrant, lived at Duran's apartment. After a delay in answering his door, police kicked it down, entered Duran's apartment and found drugs.

In State of Indiana v. Robert Richardson, No. 49S02-0910-CR-428, the Court of Appeals reversed Robert Richardson's motion to suppress evidence following a traffic stop for a seatbelt violation, finding the police officer's inquiry regarding an object in his pants didn't violate Richardson's constitutional rights or the Seatbelt Enforcement Act.

Using previous caselaw regarding the Seatbelt Enforcement Act, the appellate court ruled it wasn't impermissible under the act for the officer to ask a motorist what the large object in his pants was. The inquiry didn't exceed the scope of police behavior permitted under the Seatbelt Enforcement Act; Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution; or the Fourth Amendment, wrote Judge Paul Mathias.

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  1. Wishing Mary Willis only God's best, and superhuman strength, as she attempts to right a ship that too often strays far off course. May she never suffer this personal affect, as some do who attempt to change a broken system: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QojajMsd2nE

  2. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  3. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  4. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  5. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

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