ILNews

High court rules on client-attorney relationship

Jennifer Nelson
January 1, 2007
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The Indiana Supreme Court today ruled on a case involving an attorney-client relationship, overturning the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the attorney.

In Ronald D. Liggett, d/b/a Liggett Construction Company v. Dean A. and Elisabeth Young, No. 38S0-0703-CV-80, Liggett appealed the trial court ruling in a contract dispute with the Youngs. At the time the Youngs hired Liggett to build their home, Dean Young worked as attorney for Liggett on an unrelated matter.

Liggett initiated a third-party complaint against the Youngs when a supplier of bricks and materials sued Liggett. In turn, the Youngs brought a counterclaim against Liggett seeking damages for allegedly negligent and untimely completion of work under the building contract.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Youngs.

At a later hearing initiated by Liggett, the trial court considered a motion to reconsider the previous ruling. This time, the trial court didn't address the fact Young acted as Liggett's attorney during the drafting of the contract. Dean Young had made some changes to the contract, which was allowed as long as an attorney did the work.

The court affirmed the previous order, as did the Court of Appeals.

At issue is whether Dean Young violated Professional Conduct Rule 1.8 and the Preamble of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct by hiring Liggett as his homebuilder and making changes to the standard contract.

The evidence from the trial court doesn't show that Dean Young's transaction with Liggett was fair and honest or was a standard commercial transaction, as is required under Prof. Con. R. 1.8, wrote Justice Brent Dickson. Liggett asserted that Rule 1.8(a) rendered the contract void because Dean Young served as his attorney at the time the contract was entered into.

Of significance in this case, Justice Dickson wrote, is that Liggett's claims against the Youngs are for materials and labor not included in the original base contract but were from additional items Liggett claimed were performed at the Youngs' request. Dean Young inserted language into the contract that allowed changes to be made.

The Supreme Court concluded the evidence on the Youngs' motion for partial summary judgment did not affirmatively establish an absence of an issue of material fact that the building contract transaction was fair and honest. Also, there was nothing to show the transaction should, as a matter of law, be treated as a standard commercial transaction to which common law presumption did not apply.

The Youngs are not entitled to summary judgment on their claims or Liggett's claims against them. The court remanded the matter to the trial court to resolve the remaining claims of both parties.
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  1. Indianapolis employers harassment among minorities AFRICAN Americans needs to be discussed the metro Indianapolis area is horrible when it comes to harassing African American employees especially in the local healthcare facilities. Racially profiling in the workplace is an major issue. Please make it better because I'm many civil rights leaders would come here and justify that Indiana is a state the WORKS only applies to Caucasian Americans especially in Hamilton county. Indiana targets African Americans in the workplace so when governor pence is trying to convince people to vote for him this would be awesome publicity for the Presidency Elections.

  2. Wishing Mary Willis only God's best, and superhuman strength, as she attempts to right a ship that too often strays far off course. May she never suffer this personal affect, as some do who attempt to change a broken system: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QojajMsd2nE

  3. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  4. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  5. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

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