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High court rules on prisoners issues

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The Indiana Supreme Court handed down two opinions Wednesday in which the high court expressly adopted the "prison mailbox rule" and determined a majority of the Indiana Parole Board constitutes the full parole board when making final decisions.

Even though the state has regularly used the "prison mailbox rule" to determine whether court filings made by prisoners are timely under appellate rules, the Supreme Court never expressly adopted the rule. The high court did so in Regunal Dowell v. State of Indiana, No. 32S01-1003-PC-136, requiring that litigants must still provide reasonable, legitimate, and verifiable documentation of the filing.

Dowell appealed the post-conviction court's denial of his motion to correct error. He claimed he put the motion in the correctional facility's mail system within the 30-day deadline, although it wasn't file stamped by the county clerk until two days later. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court.

The high court went through several previous cases involving the mailbox rule and explained that pro se prisoners need to provide reasonable, legitimate, and verifiable documentation supporting the claim that a document was timely submitted to prison officials for mailing. When the proof is lacking, the courts can't rule the filing was timely. Under Indiana Trial Rule 5, the mailbox rule applies when the court can see the prisoner used certified mail, return receipt requested, and deposited the mailing by or before the filing deadline.

But Dowell used regular mail, and had no evidence to show he timely filed his motion, so the trial court appropriately date-stamped it on the day it arrived in the clerk's office. The Supreme Court dismissed his appeal because it wasn't timely filed.

In Kevin S. Varner v. Indiana Parole Board, No. 45S04-0909-CR-407, the justices held that a majority of the Indiana Parole Board constitutes the "full parole board" under the statute governing final decisions that require the full parole board to make the determination. Only four members voted on whether Kevin Varner should be paroled; two voted yes, two voted no, and the fifth member wasn't present. Because he didn't receive a majority, he asked if there could be a rehearing so the fifth member could cast a vote, but the board denied his request. The Court of Appeals held that all five members were required by statute to vote on his parole.

The phrase "full parole board" isn't defined in Indiana Code Section 11-13-3-3(b), but the high court concluded it means that just a majority must vote, and not all five members. Reading the statute that way comports with the legislature's rules of statutory construction and interpreting it that way is supported by the board's administrative rules, wrote Justice Frank Sullivan. The justices also compared the statute to those governing workers' compensation, in which the courts have repeatedly held that a decision by the "full board" doesn't mean all five members participate in the hearing and final award, as long as a majority of the board approves the finding and award.

"...we believe the interpretation by the Court of Appeals would limit the ability of the Board to discharge its duties to a degree well beyond that which we believe the Legislature intended," wrote Justice Sullivan. "As the State points out, to require all Board members to vote on each parole decision would cause unnecessary delay in the grant of parole."

The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion except for the portion addressing subject matter jurisdiction and denied Varner's request for a writ of mandamus.

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  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

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