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High court splits in hospital negligence suit

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The Indiana Supreme Court split on whether a hospital was negligent in letting a woman with injuries possibly caused by domestic violence leave with her alleged abuser, who killed her on the way home after being discharged. The majority affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hospital and treating physician, but the dissenting justices believed the issues should be up to a judge or jury to decide.

In Ava McSwane, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Malia Vandeneede, et al., v. Bloomington Hospital and Healthcare System and Jean M. Eelma, M.D., No. 53S04-0808-CV-420, Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard and Justices Frank Sullivan and Theodore Boehm affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hospital and Dr. Jean Eelma in a medical malpractice suit filed by Malia Vandeneede's mother, Ava McSwane.

Malia and Monty Vandeneede, Malia's ex-husband with whom she still lived, went to Bloomington Hospital for treatment of what Malia said were injuries after she fell off a horse. Monty never left Malia alone with staff except for a few occasions. Her injuries caused a nurse to believe Malia may have been abused, but Malia denied any abuse. The nurse reported the incident to the surgery nurse on duty. Eelma examined Malia and performed her surgery.

McSwane came to the hospital and told staff she believed Malia had been abused by Monty. At her discharge, a nurse told Malia she didn't have to leave with Monty, but she said she wanted to. On their way home, Monty killed Malia in their car and then himself.

McSwane filed a medical malpractice suit on behalf of Malia's estate against the hospital and Eelma. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. A split Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, finding the hospital owed a duty to Malia.

"It is straightforward enough to say that a hospital's duty of care to a patient who presents observable signs of domestic abuse includes some reasonable measures to address the patient's risk," wrote Chief Justice Shepard.

He noted the hospital took several such actions, including direct suggestions that abuse may be the cause of Malia's injuries and letting her know she didn't have to leave with Monty.

The hospital staff couldn't have physically restrained Malia from leaving with Monty because that would interfere with patient autonomy and informed consent, two touchstones of medical malpractice law, the chief justice wrote.

The majority also affirmed that Malia's insistence on leaving with her ex-husband despite offers by hospital staff and her mother's pleas to stay was negligence that contributed to her injury. The hospital claimed Malia was alert and oriented and capable of making her own decisions when she was discharged, despite being on pain medication.

But these issues should have been presented to a trier of fact, wrote Justice Robert Rucker in his dissenting opinion, with which Justice Brent Dickson concurred.

The record showed that Eelma was never informed of the alleged abuse and may have been able to talk to Malia about it when they were alone and before she was heavily medicated. Justice Rucker also questioned whether Malia could have made reasonable decisions given the amount of drugs in her system after the surgery.

"Thus, a fact-finder should determine whether having received general anesthetic, a relaxant, numerous doses of various opiates for pain, and being advised by Hospital not to make any important decisions, Malia was exercising that degree of care that a reasonable person under the same or similar condition would have been expected to exercise when she decided to leave the hospital with her former husband," he wrote.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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