ILNews

IBA: New Law Changes Child Support Age: Are You Prepared?

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

By Eric N. Engebretson, Whitham Hebenstreit & Zubek LLP

engebretson-eric.jpg Engebretson

Effective July 1, 2012, the law regarding a parent’s duty to support a child changed dramatically. Absent certain circumstances, previously a parent was obligated to pay child support until a child was 21 years of age. However, pursuant to the amended versions of I.C. §31-14-11-18 and §31-16-6-6, child support now generally terminates as of a child’s 19th birthday.

At the outset, it is worth noting that a footnote to a recent opinion of the Indiana Court of Appeals raises the possibility that the amended law might be subject to challenge on constitutional grounds, at least as it applies to certain parties. Specifically, in Sexton v. Sexton, 2012 WL 2054859, the Court suggests that the law may be unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 24 of the Indiana Constitution which prohibits ex post facto laws or laws impairing the obligations of existing contracts. However, assuming that the law is upheld, this change represents a relatively significant departure from prior law.

Any party currently receiving support will now need to anticipate that any support he or she is receiving will terminate and/or decrease as of a child’s 19th birthday. Whether or not child support terminates or simply needs to be modified will likely depend upon whether there are any other minor children born of the relationship. Similarly, those parties currently paying support need to be aware that they can seek to have the child support obligation terminated as of a child’s 19th birthday as opposed to waiting until a child is 21. This is particularly important in situations where there is an “in gross” order representing a child support obligation paid on behalf of multiple children. In such a situation the child support payor needs to be aware that he or she can seek a modification of the existing child support obligation earlier than was allowed under prior law so that an appropriate adjustment can be determined in light of the eldest child’s 19th birthday.

This change in the law also affects the time within which both the courts and the parties can address an appropriate division of post-secondary educational expenses. As a general rule, any request for a contribution toward educational expenses must be made prior to a child being emancipated. As a result, in the event a party has a child that will soon be at least 19 years of age and there is not an educational order already in place, it is important that the party desiring such a contribution get a petition seeking such assistance on file prior to the child’s birthday. Failure to do so could result in the petition being dismissed as untimely filed, since once a child is emancipated the court cannot entertain any such request for assistance. As a brief aside, even in the event of an untimely filed petition, the Sexton decision does suggest that trial courts will need to examine disputes on a case-by-case basis to determine whether or not support orders for college-age students implicitly include an educational component even though the support order does not specifically refer to the support as educational.

The one exception to this rule regarding seeking a contribution toward post-secondary educational expenses concerns paternity cases. Pursuant to the amended version of I.C. § 31-14-11-18(b), a child who is receiving child support under an order issued before July 1, 2012, has until they are 21 years of age to file a petition requesting assistance with their educational needs. It is important to note that this “savings clause” does not apply in dissolution cases as the legislature only included it in the amendment to the paternity statute.

Assuming that an order regarding post-secondary educational expenses is in place or can be inferred, clients need to be advised that the actual monetary obligation related to a 19-year-old child may not dramatically change notwithstanding that the obligation to pay child support will now terminate earlier. The reason is that in addition to tuition, room and board, lab fees and supplies, the term “educational expense” has been defined in various cases to include things such as transportation expenses, car insurance, clothing, entertainment, cell phones, entertainment, food, athletic passes, and other incidentals. The term has even been found to include room and board to be paid by one parent to another when a student resides at home while pursuing an education. While these expenses have always been at issue, presumably the fact that child support was previously paid until a child turned 21 at least helped mitigate and/or diffuse certain disputes over them.•

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. The appellate court just said doctors can be sued for reporting child abuse. The most dangerous form of child abuse with the highest mortality rate of any form of child abuse (between 6% and 9% according to the below listed studies). Now doctors will be far less likely to report this form of dangerous child abuse in Indiana. If you want to know what this is, google the names Lacey Spears, Julie Conley (and look at what happened when uninformed judges returned that child against medical advice), Hope Ybarra, and Dixie Blanchard. Here is some really good reporting on what this allegation was: http://media.star-telegram.com/Munchausenmoms/ Here are the two research papers: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0145213487900810 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0145213403000309 25% of sibling are dead in that second study. 25%!!! Unbelievable ruling. Chilling. Wrong.

  2. MELISA EVA VALUE INVESTMENT Greetings to you from Melisa Eva Value Investment. We offer Business and Personal loans, it is quick and easy and hence can be availed without any hassle. We do not ask for any collateral or guarantors while approving these loans and hence these loans require minimum documentation. We offer great and competitive interest rates of 2% which do not weigh you down too much. These loans have a comfortable pay-back period. Apply today by contacting us on E-mail: melisaeva9@gmail.com WE DO NOT ASK FOR AN UPFRONT FEE. BEWARE OF SCAMMERS AND ONLINE FRAUD.

  3. Mr. Levin says that the BMV engaged in misconduct--that the BMV (or, rather, someone in the BMV) knew Indiana motorists were being overcharged fees but did nothing to correct the situation. Such misconduct, whether engaged in by one individual or by a group, is called theft (defined as knowingly or intentionally exerting unauthorized control over the property of another person with the intent to deprive the other person of the property's value or use). Theft is a crime in Indiana (as it still is in most of the civilized world). One wonders, then, why there have been no criminal prosecutions of BMV officials for this theft? Government misconduct doesn't occur in a vacuum. An individual who works for or oversees a government agency is responsible for the misconduct. In this instance, somebody (or somebodies) with the BMV, at some time, knew Indiana motorists were being overcharged. What's more, this person (or these people), even after having the error of their ways pointed out to them, did nothing to fix the problem. Instead, the overcharges continued. Thus, the taxpayers of Indiana are also on the hook for the millions of dollars in attorneys fees (for both sides; the BMV didn't see fit to avail itself of the services of a lawyer employed by the state government) that had to be spent in order to finally convince the BMV that stealing money from Indiana motorists was a bad thing. Given that the BMV official(s) responsible for this crime continued their misconduct, covered it up, and never did anything until the agency reached an agreeable settlement, it seems the statute of limitations for prosecuting these folks has not yet run. I hope our Attorney General is paying attention to this fiasco and is seriously considering prosecution. Indiana, the state that works . . . for thieves.

  4. I'm glad that attorney Carl Hayes, who represented the BMV in this case, is able to say that his client "is pleased to have resolved the issue". Everyone makes mistakes, even bureaucratic behemoths like Indiana's BMV. So to some extent we need to be forgiving of such mistakes. But when those mistakes are going to cost Indiana taxpayers millions of dollars to rectify (because neither plaintiff's counsel nor Mr. Hayes gave freely of their services, and the BMV, being a state-funded agency, relies on taxpayer dollars to pay these attorneys their fees), the agency doesn't have a right to feel "pleased to have resolved the issue". One is left wondering why the BMV feels so pleased with this resolution? The magnitude of the agency's overcharges might suggest to some that, perhaps, these errors were more than mere oversight. Could this be why the agency is so "pleased" with this resolution? Will Indiana motorists ever be assured that the culture of incompetence (if not worse) that the BMV seems to have fostered is no longer the status quo? Or will even more "overcharges" and lawsuits result? It's fairly obvious who is really "pleased to have resolved the issue", and it's not Indiana's taxpayers who are on the hook for the legal fees generated in these cases.

  5. From the article's fourth paragraph: "Her work underscores the blurry lines in Russia between the government and businesses . . ." Obviously, the author of this piece doesn't pay much attention to the "blurry lines" between government and businesses that exist in the United States. And I'm not talking only about Trump's alleged conflicts of interest. When lobbyists for major industries (pharmaceutical, petroleum, insurance, etc) have greater access to this country's elected representatives than do everyday individuals (i.e., voters), then I would say that the lines between government and business in the United States are just as blurry, if not more so, than in Russia.

ADVERTISEMENT