ILNews

IBA: Interrogations - Indiana to Provide More Safeguards; SCOTUS Takes Some Away

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share
Bell James Bell
klem-meaghans-mug Klem

By James J. Bell and Meaghan E. Klem, Bingham McHale LLP

The effective date of Rule 617 of the Indiana Rules of Evidence is only a couple of weeks away. Rule 617 provides procedural safeguards for suspects in “Custodial Interrogation in a Place of Detention.” Rule 617 prohibits the admission of a statement of a defendant “[i]n a felony prosecution, . . . unless an Electronic Recording of the statement was made, preserved, and is available at trial.” While this Rule has several exceptions, its safeguards provide assurances that evidence of a suspect’s statements will be accurate when admitted at trial.

While the Supreme Court of Indiana is adding procedural safeguards to police interrogations, during its last term, the Supreme Court of the United States chipped away at a suspect’s Miranda rights. As shown below, in Florida v. Powell, Maryland v. Shatzer, and Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court diminished the government’s burden in complying with Miranda and made it more difficult for a defendant to invoke his Miranda rights.

In Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010), the defendant was arrested and, prior to being interrogated, was read the police department’s “Consent and Release” form. This form warned the defendant that he had the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of the officers’ questions and that if he could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed before questioning. He was further told that he had the right to assert any of those rights at any time during the interview. During the course of the interrogation, the defendant made inculpatory statements. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was not properly informed of his Miranda right to have counsel present during his questioning. However, the Supreme Court found the warning provided to the defendant to be sufficient. “In combination. the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times.” Id. at 1205.

In Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010), the Court limited the holding in Edwards v. Arizona, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981). Edwards created a presumption that once a suspect invoked his Miranda right to the presence of counsel, any waiver was to be deemed involuntary. Shatzer addressed a circumstance in which a suspect’s protections under Edwards expired.

In Shatzer, the defendant was imprisoned for one crime, and a detective attempted to interrogate him for a second crime. In the interrogation, the defendant was read his Miranda rights and invoked his right to have counsel present. The detective terminated the interview, and the defendant was released back into the general population of the prison. Two years later, a different detective went to the prison and again attempted to interrogate the defendant. On this occasion, the detective read the defendant his Miranda rights, and the defendant waived his right to counsel and made incriminating statements.

On appeal, the defendant argued that a mere passage of time did not terminate his Edwards protections. However, the Supreme Court held that because the defendant experienced a “break in Miranda custody” that lasted more than two weeks, suppression of the statement was not required. Id. at 1227. In reaching this decision, the Court noted that the purpose of Edwards was to prevent police from “badgering” a suspect. According to the Court, a suspect would be more likely to be coerced into making a statement if he was left in uninterrupted Miranda custody. However, when a suspect receives a “break in custody” and is allowed to return to his normal life, there is less likelihood of coercion.

Finally, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010), the Court considered a case where the defendant was arrested and interrogated for three hours. He was advised of his Miranda rights but remained largely silent for hours. Despite remaining silent, he never explicitly stated that he wished to invoke his Miranda rights. At the end of the interrogation, the defendant answered ‘yes’ to the question of whether he had prayed for forgiveness for his crime.

Ironically, the Court held that silence was not sufficient to invoke one’s right to silence. As pointed out by Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, in order to remain silent, one must “counterintuitively” speak. Id. at 2278. The Court held that a suspect must unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent. The defendant’s response to officers after hours of questioning demonstrated an implied waiver. Because proper warnings had been given and the defendant remained silent, there was no other coercion, and his eventual response constituted a waiver.•
 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Indianapolis employers harassment among minorities AFRICAN Americans needs to be discussed the metro Indianapolis area is horrible when it comes to harassing African American employees especially in the local healthcare facilities. Racially profiling in the workplace is an major issue. Please make it better because I'm many civil rights leaders would come here and justify that Indiana is a state the WORKS only applies to Caucasian Americans especially in Hamilton county. Indiana targets African Americans in the workplace so when governor pence is trying to convince people to vote for him this would be awesome publicity for the Presidency Elections.

  2. Wishing Mary Willis only God's best, and superhuman strength, as she attempts to right a ship that too often strays far off course. May she never suffer this personal affect, as some do who attempt to change a broken system: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QojajMsd2nE

  3. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  4. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  5. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

ADVERTISEMENT