IBA: Recent Cases Highlight Greater Protection Afforded by Indiana Constitution

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IBA Crim JusticeThe Indiana Constitution often affords criminal defendants greater protections than the U.S Constitution. In the past two months, Indiana courts have demonstrated this to be true, particularly in the context of search and seizure. As show below, in addressing these issues, Indiana courts have expressed a clear willingness to diverge from U.S. Constitutional doctrines when it comes to protecting individual rights.

“Knock-and-Announce” and “Attenuation Doctrine” Under the Indiana Constitution

In the landmark case of Hudson v. Michigan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when police officers violate the knock-and-announce rule. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006). In Lacey, the Indiana Court of Appeals departed from the federal standard and found that a knock-and-announce violation may lead to the suppression of evidence.

In Lacey, the police obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s residence for illegal drugs and weapons. Lacey v. State, 931 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The Police Emergency Services Team decided to execute a “no-knock” search because of the defendant’s criminal history. Id. However, this criminal history was never disclosed to a neutral magistrate. Subsequently, the police officers forcefully entered the residence using a ramming device and announced their presence as they gained entry. Id. After a search and seizure, the defendant was charged with possession of a weapon, possession of marijuana, and maintaining a common nuisance. Id. The defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained in the search because the “no-knock” search violated his rights under the Indiana Constitution. Id.

The Indiana Court of Appeals held that “the unilateral decision to dispense with the knock-and-announce rule [was] unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution where the relevant facts could have been presented in application for a ‘no-knock’ warrant.” Lacey, 931 N.E.2d at 385. In so holding, the court observed that there were no exigent circumstances to justify a no-knock search. Id. Additionally, the court determined that the officer should have presented the defendant’s criminal history to a neutral magistrate when obtaining the warrant. Id. At 384. The court then determined that the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation was suppression of the evidence. In so doing, the court explicitly rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis in Hudson.

In Trotter, the Indiana Court of Appeals again parted ways with the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to the attenuation doctrine. Under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the exclusionary rule does not apply when the connection between unlawful police conduct and the subsequent discovery of evidence “become[s] so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).

In Trotter, the defendant was charged with two class D felonies for pointing a firearm and criminal recklessness after police officers unlawfully entered a pole barn and discovered the defendant pointing a firearm at them. Trotter v. State, 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS 1686, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2010). The defendant moved to suppress evidence, claiming that the officers’ warrantless entry into the private residence violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. At *5–6. Ultimately, the trial court determined that suppression was not required “pursuant to the attenuation doctrine exception to the exclusionary rule.” Id at *7.

On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals first determined that the officers’ warrantless entry violated both the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. Id. At *13. The Court then turned to the State’s argument that the evidence should not be suppressed because the defendants’ pointing a firearm at the officers “dissipated the taint” of the unlawful entry. Trotter, 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS, at *15. The court disagreed, and held that “the attenuation doctrine as it currently exists as a separate analysis to circumvent the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment purposes has no application under the Indiana Constitution.” Id. At *17–18. Therefore, because the attenuation doctrine did not apply, suppression of the evidence was warranted. Id. At *18.

Preserving Indiana Constitutional Claims

Lacey and Trotter reinforce the need for Indiana criminal defense attorneys to properly preserve claims under the Indiana Constitution. However, in order to preserve an Indiana Constitutional claim, an attorney cannot merely object to evidence and make passing reference to the Indiana Constitution or even a specific article in the Indiana Constitution. At a minimum, when a litigant attempts to invoke Indiana Constitutional protections, the litigant must “provide a separate analysis of the state . . . [constitutional] claim or argue why it provides protection different than the federal constitution.” Valentin v. State, 688 N.E.2d 412, 413 (Ind.1997).

In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that when “a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion,” it is assumed that the decision was grounded on federal law. Similarly, when a defendant fails to provide a state constitutional claim “separate” from a federal claim, our state courts will “only analyze” the claim under federal standards. Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 473 n. 7 (Ind. 1997) overruled on other grounds.•


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  1. If a class action suit or other manner of retribution is possible, count me in. I have email and voicemail from the man. He colluded with opposing counsel, I am certain. My case was damaged so severely it nearly lost me everything and I am still paying dearly.

  2. There's probably a lot of blame that can be cast around for Indiana Tech's abysmal bar passage rate this last February. The folks who decided that Indiana, a state with roughly 16,000 to 18,000 attorneys, needs a fifth law school need to question the motives that drove their support of this project. Others, who have been "strong supporters" of the law school, should likewise ask themselves why they believe this institution should be supported. Is it because it fills some real need in the state? Or is it, instead, nothing more than a resume builder for those who teach there part-time? And others who make excuses for the students' poor performance, especially those who offer nothing more than conspiracy theories to back up their claims--who are they helping? What evidence do they have to support their posturing? Ultimately, though, like most everything in life, whether one succeeds or fails is entirely within one's own hands. At least one student from Indiana Tech proved this when he/she took and passed the February bar. A second Indiana Tech student proved this when they took the bar in another state and passed. As for the remaining 9 who took the bar and didn't pass (apparently, one of the students successfully appealed his/her original score), it's now up to them (and nobody else) to ensure that they pass on their second attempt. These folks should feel no shame; many currently successful practicing attorneys failed the bar exam on their first try. These same attorneys picked themselves up, dusted themselves off, and got back to the rigorous study needed to ensure they would pass on their second go 'round. This is what the Indiana Tech students who didn't pass the first time need to do. Of course, none of this answers such questions as whether Indiana Tech should be accredited by the ABA, whether the school should keep its doors open, or, most importantly, whether it should have even opened its doors in the first place. Those who promoted the idea of a fifth law school in Indiana need to do a lot of soul-searching regarding their decisions. These same people should never be allowed, again, to have a say about the future of legal education in this state or anywhere else. Indiana already has four law schools. That's probably one more than it really needs. But it's more than enough.

  3. This man Steve Hubbard goes on any online post or forum he can find and tries to push his company. He said court reporters would be obsolete a few years ago, yet here we are. How does he have time to search out every single post about court reporters and even spy in private court reporting forums if his company is so successful???? Dude, get a life. And back to what this post was about, I agree that some national firms cause a huge problem.

  4. rensselaer imdiana is doing same thing to children from the judge to attorney and dfs staff they need to be investigated as well

  5. Sex offenders are victims twice, once when they are molested as kids, and again when they repeat the behavior, you never see money spent on helping them do you. That's why this circle continues