ILNews

Improper venue doesn't require acquittal

Back to TopE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Even though the Hamilton Superior Court erred in concluding it was the proper venue for a felony child solicitation charge, the error doesn't warrant an acquittal of the conviction, the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded today. The case was remanded for retrial in the proper venue of Madison County.

In Dustin Neff v. State of Indiana, No. 29A02-0904-CR-332, Dustin Neff challenged his conviction of Class C felony child solicitation. Neff chatted with "Lizzy" online, whom he believed to be a 12-year-old girl in Carmel. "Lizzy" was actually a woman from Georgia who volunteered for Perverted Justice, an organization in which volunteers try to catch adults in Internet chat rooms who try to prey on children.

In his chats with Lizzy, Neff asked for pictures, asked her if she'd want to kiss and indicated he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. They arranged to meet at Dairy Queen in Carmel. After driving from his home in Madison County, Carmel police - who were tipped off by the volunteer from Georgia - arrested Neff after he admitted to driving there to meet Lizzy.

At closing argument, he argued Hamilton County wasn't the proper venue; the Hamilton Superior Court disagreed and he was convicted of the charge at a bench trial.

Neff challenged his conviction, arguing there isn't sufficient evidence because the information on the case alleged that "on or about May 2, 2006," Neff committed child solicitation. Neff relied on the contents of the May 2 chat, and he claimed the conversation didn't rise to the level of child solicitation. But the contents of an April 29 chat provided sufficient evidence of child solicitation, wrote Judge Michael Barnes. The precise date of the alleged solicitation isn't of the essence of the offense of child solicitation, nor was Neff misled into believing the state wouldn't rely on evidence related to the April 29 chat.

The appellate court agreed with Neff that Hamilton County wasn't the proper venue since he was in Madison County while chatting with the woman from Georgia. Neff completed all the conduct required to establish child solicitation when he sat at his computer in Madison County.

"Although venue for a chain of criminal events may lay in any county in which any of the events occurred, Neff did not engage in any conduct in furtherance of child solicitation in Hamilton County," wrote the judge.

Then the issue arose whether the venue error would lead to an acquittal of the charges or if he could be retried in Madison County.

"The question here, then, is whether our reversal of Neff's conviction due to improper venue is an acquittal based upon insufficient evidence or a reversal based on legal error for double jeopardy purposes. We conclude it is the latter," Judge Barnes wrote.

The state's failure to prove venue in Hamilton County was not a failure to prove an element of the offense and implies nothing with respect to Neff's guilt or innocence. The case is to be transferred to Madison County for further proceedings.

ADVERTISEMENT

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

ADVERTISEMENT