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IndyBar: A Proposal to Allow Citations of All Indiana Appellate Opinions

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iba-citations.jpgAppellate Rule 65 currently prohibits lawyers from citing or relying on the nearly 75 percent of Indiana Court of Appeals’ opinions issued as memorandum (not-for-publication) decisions. These opinions, however, are easily accessible on Lexis, Westlaw, and CaseMaker—and often provide helpful analysis when considering an issue.

The Rules Committee of the Indiana Supreme Court has proposed changing this rule to allow citation of memorandum (non-for-publication) decisions as persuasive precedent. The proposed rule makes clear: “A party or attorney has no duty to cite a memorandum decision.” The new rule would not create additional work for lawyers. In many cases, lawyers will find and continue to rely on ample binding (published) authority. In cases without helpful controlling precedent, under the new rule, lawyers need not resort to other jurisdictions to find support, but instead may rely on relevant memorandum (not-for-publication) decisions within Indiana as persuasive precedent.

A task force of the Indianapolis Bar Association Appellate Practice Section crafted this proposal, which the executive committees of the Appellate Practice, Criminal Justice, and Litigation sections each respectively supported. The proposal was ultimately approved for submission to the Rules Committee by the IndyBar Board of Directors at its December 2013 meeting.

IndyBar members are encouraged to share your comments on the proposed rule. Feedback is essential to the Rules Committee and ultimately the Indiana Supreme Court justices in deciding whether to adopt a proposed rule or to make changes to the proposal. Without it, this rule will not be approved.

Comments can be short or lengthy. Consider beginning with an introduction of yourself (including years in practice and practice areas(s) before explaining your experience with the current rule and your reasons for supporting the change. You may wish to identify any specific instances where you have encountered and been unable to cite helpful memorandum decisions. Alternatively, a concise statement of your support for the rule will be valued.•

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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