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Insurer not allowed to substitute party name

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An insurance company isn't allowed to substitute another party's name in a suit filed by a driver for her underinsured motorist benefits because there's no authority for substitution of a non-party before a jury in a contract case, the Indiana Court of Appeals decided today. Doing so would create a "legal fiction" before the jury.

In Marijeanne Brown-Day v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 49A02-0903-CV-277, the Court of Appeals accepted Marijeanne Brown-Day's interlocutory appeal to review pretrial orders that granted Allstate Insurance's motion for party substitution and a motion in limine that collectively prohibited any explicit reference to Allstate.

Brown-Day was injured in an accident caused by Michelle Lobdell; Lobdell admitted fault and Brown-Day settled with Lobdell's insurer. Brown-Day then pursued a claim against her insurer, Allstate, for underinsured motorist benefits of $100,000. Lobdell was dismissed as a defendant from the suit with prejudice. The complaint was set for a jury trial.

Two years later, Allstate moved to substitute Lobdell as the sole defendant for trial to protect it from unfair prejudice should the jury know that underinsured motorist coverage was applicable to damages. The trial court granted that motion and another that prohibited Brown-Day from referring to the underinsured motorist claim, the Allstate policy, or the limits of the UIM coverage. It also excluded evidence of past dealings and payments Allstate made to its examiner/expert witness.

Allstate believed based on Indiana Evidence Rule 411 and Wineinger v. Ellis, 855 N.E.2d 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), it could substitute another party to lessen prejudice in insurance cases.

"Evidence Rule 411 simply is not a mechanism providing for an outright substitution of parties so that the identity of a party as an insurer may be shielded. It does not contemplate the creation of a fiction to avoid possible prejudicial effects from a reference to insurance or an insurer," wrote Judge L. Mark Bailey.

Even if the appellate court assumed the prejudice could have been lessened if Lobdell remained a defendant, Allstate allowed her dismissal with prejudice instead of advancing payment and asserting a subrogation interest pursuant to Indiana Code Section 27-7-5-6.

And Allstate's reliance on Wineinger is misplaced because unlike that case, there is no other named defendant and that case was substantively a tort claim.

"Allstate wants the benefit of its bargain with Brown-Day, that is, the contractual limitation on Brown-Day's recovery. Neither Evidence Rule 411 nor Wineinger provides authority for substitution of a non-party in place of a party so as to create a legal fiction before the jury in a contract case," he wrote.

The Court of Appeals also found the trial court erred in not allowing Brown-Day to inquire about the payments Allstate made to its examiner/expert witness based on Evidence Rule 616. The source of witness income goes to the heart of bias or prejudice, and excluding evidence relevant to the jury's credibility assessment would operate as an invasion on the province of the jury, wrote Judge Bailey.

The case is remanded for further proceedings.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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