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Judge believes court could remove man from sex offender list

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Indiana Court of Appeals Chief Judge Margret Robb dissented from her colleagues in a case involving a man who wanted his name taken off the Indiana Sex Offender Registry.

Jeremiah Cline had sex with a 15-year-old and 14-year-old in February and June 2001. An amendment to the Indiana Sex Offender Act effective July 1, 2001, required someone with Cline’s Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor convictions to register as a sex offender.

When he was released from prison, he was required to register. In 2011, he sought to have his name removed from the registry. The trial court found he had no obligation to continue to register but that it lacked authority to “expunge” his existing information from the registry.

Judges L. Mark Bailey and Paul Mathias agreed, pointing out that Cline argues for complete expungement of his name and information from the registry because retention of that information has a punitive effect upon him. The majority declined to read Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009), as broadly as Cline wants and won’t add a provision to include expungement, Bailey wrote.

Although Indiana Code 11-8-8-22, the statute created as a result of Wallace to provide for how to remove one’s name from the registry, provides a mechanism to petition the court for relief from obligation of continued registration and disclosure, the majority believed that Cline must go through administrative routes with the Department of Correction to remove his name.

Robb wrote that the majority misused the term “expungement” and that Cline wanted removal of his name, not a complete erasure of his record. She believed that I.C. 11-8-8-22, which “is poorly written and confusing,” allows the trial court to remove one’s name from the registry. If the statute does not mean that a court may remove an offender’s name and information, then it has no meaning at all, she wrote.


 

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  • Constitution
    I think all judges need to read, study and try to understand our U.S. condtitution and state constitution, especially article 1 section 19 of the Indiana Constitution, which states that in all criminal cases whatever, the jury, shall have the right to determine the law and the facts. In the abscence of a jury, the judge is the jury.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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