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Judges affirm decision in speedy trial claim

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A Hendricks County judge did not err in denying a man’s motion that his criminal case be discharged because the state failed to conduct a speedy trial within one year of charges being filed, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled.

Charged in March 2009 with disorderly conduct and intimidation resulting from a domestic disturbance at the home of his son and daughter-in-law, the case against Mark Todisco experienced numerous delays before a jury trial was set for September 2010. Todisco filed a motion in August 2010 requesting that the case be discharged under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C), which generally requires the case be brought to trial within a year of the charges. The trial court found he didn’t timely object to the trial date and denied his motion, and a jury found him guilty of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct.

In Mark Todisco v. State of Indiana, No. 32A01-1108-CR-393, the judges determined that Todisco failed to promptly and specifically object when the trial date was set beyond the one-year period. He had two chances to raise the speedy trial issue, but he failed to do so.

The court also acknowledged that the standard of review for Criminal Rule 4(C) appeals has been somewhat unsettled, but the court referenced its recent ruling in Feuston v. State, 953 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), that held disputed facts are entitled to deference but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Since the trial court didn’t issue findings of fact in this case, the appellate panel reviewed this appeal de novo.
 

 

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  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

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