ILNews

Judges decline to find OWI statute unconstitutional

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected a man’s claim that the statute proscribing the operation of a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance violates the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution.

Chad E. Hucker was charged with Class C misdemeanors operating a vehicle while intoxicated and operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance. He was pulled over by police after a patron at a liquor store reported Hucker may be driving while intoxicated. Hucker told officers his seemingly intoxicated behavior may be a result of recently taking his prescription Xanax.

At his jury trial, Hucker testified he had a prescription for the drug but admitted to taking it in excess of the recommended dosage on the day of the incident.

In Chad E. Hucker v. State of Indiana, 35A02-1307-CR-575, Hucker challenged the second prong of the Collins test regarding Section 23: The preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. He argued that members within the identified class are treated unequally because criminal exposure under the statute varies depending on the dosage of drug taken, whether an individual is a chronic user, the nature of the metabolite, and other arguments.

“The second prong of the Collins test requires that a statute must apply equally and uniformly to all persons who share those characteristics that are the basis of the classification,” Judge Margret Robb wrote. “Assuming it is proper under Section 23 to create classifications based on persons who drive with a schedule I or II controlled substance and persons who do not, Indiana Code section 9-30-5-1(c) is not unconstitutional.”

He also argued that the statute treats as identical a number of controlled substances that have varying effects on the body. Robb noted this is a fair point, but one that is better placed before the General Assembly.

“The disparate treatment to persons who operate a vehicle with a schedule I or schedule II controlled substance is reasonably related to inherent characteristics among those persons — namely, the usage of those controlled substances causes impairment and the amount necessary to cause impairment is not easily quantifiable. Given the ‘substantial deference’ we must provide the General Assembly in generating such classifications, we cannot find the statute unconstitutional under Section 23.”

 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. My husband financed a car through Wells Fargo In dec 2007 and in Jan 2012 they took him to court to garnish his wages through a company called autovest llc . Do u think the statue of limitations apply from the day last payment was received or from what should have been the completion of the loan

  2. Andrew, you are a whistleblower against an ideologically corrupt system that is also an old boys network ... Including old gals .... You are a huge threat to them. Thieves, liars, miscreants they understand, identify with, coddle. But whistleblowers must go to the stake. Burn well my friend, burn brightly, tyger.

  3. VSB dismissed the reciprocal discipline based on what Indiana did to me. Here we have an attorney actually breaking ethical rules, dishonest behavior, and only getting a reprimand. I advocated that this supreme court stop discriminating against me and others based on disability, and I am SUSPENDED 180 days. Time to take out the checkbook and stop the arrogant cheating to hurt me and retaliate against my good faith efforts to stop the discrimination of this Court. www.andrewstraw.org www.andrewstraw.net

  4. http://www.andrewstraw.org http://www.andrewstraw.net If another state believes by "Clear and convincing evidence" standard that Indiana's discipline was not valid and dismissed it, it is time for Curtis Hill to advise his clients to get out the checkbook. Discrimination time is over.

  5. Congrats Andrew, your street cred just shot up. As for me ... I am now an administrative law judge in Kansas, commissioned by the Governor to enforce due process rights against overreaching government agents. That after being banished for life from the Indiana bar for attempting to do the same as a mere whistleblowing bar applicant. The myth of one lowly peasant with the constitution does not play well in the Hoosier state. As for what our experiences have in common, I have good reason to believe that the same ADA Coordinator who took you out was working my file since 2007, when the former chief justice hired the same, likely to "take out the politically incorrect trash" like me. My own dealings with that powerful bureaucrat and some rather astounding actions .. actions that would make most state courts blush ... actions blessed in full by the Ind.S.Ct ... here: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS

ADVERTISEMENT