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Judges disagree as how to review sentence

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A panel of Indiana Court of Appeals judges affirmed today that a defendant's sentence following a guilty plea wasn't inappropriate, but the judges didn't agree as to how to reach that conclusion.

In T. L. Brandon Hollar v. State of Indiana, No. 43A05-0906-CR-319, Judges L. Mark Bailey and Cale Bradford relied on Jenkins v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), to determine T. L. Brandon Hollar's sentence of three years in prison with two years suspended wasn't inappropriate. Hollar pro se pleaded guilty to Class D felony nonsupport of a dependent child and argued on appeal that he received the maximum sentence despite the two years being suspended to probation. He wanted the Court of Appeals to revise it through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

The split Jenkins court concluded that in analyzing whether a sentence is inappropriate under Rule 7(B), anything less than a fully executed sentence of the maximum length doesn't constitute a maximum sentence. It also ruled that it's not realistic to consider a year of probation, a year in community corrections, and a year in prison as equivalent.

The majority looked at whether Hollar's sentence was composed of executed imprisonment time, in whole or in part, or included any alternatives to incarceration while performing the 7(B) analysis. It determined based on the nature of the offense and Hollar's character, he hadn't persuaded the appellate court that his sentence was inappropriate.

Judge Nancy Vaidik agreed with the result of the majority's ruling, but believed the court should use a different approach in evaluating sentences. She referred to Mask v. State, 829 N.E.2d 932, 935-36 (Ind. 2005).

"A probationary term poses the very 'real possibility' that a defendant will have to serve his suspended sentence," she wrote. "Whether or not this is within the control of the defendant, I find it unrealistic to ignore the suspended portions of a sentence and review only those portions ordered executed."

Her main concern was if the appellate court declines to review the totality of a potential sentence on direct appeal, the defendant would have no other opportunity to challenge the appropriateness of the sentence should probation be revoked. She declined to follow Jenkins and instead would review the entirety of Hollar's suspended and executed sentences for inappropriateness. She also concluded based on his character and the circumstances of the case, his sentence is appropriate.

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  1. Living in South Bend, I travel to Michigan a lot. Virtually every gas station sells cold beer there. Many sell the hard stuff too. Doesn't seem to be a big deal there.

  2. Mr. Ricker, how foolish of you to think that by complying with the law you would be ok. Don't you know that Indiana is a state that welcomes monopolies, and that Indiana's legislature is the one entity in this state that believes monopolistic practices (such as those engaged in by Indiana Association of Beverage Retailers) make Indiana a "business-friendly" state? How can you not see this????

  3. Actually, and most strikingly, the ruling failed to address the central issue to the whole case: Namely, Black Knight/LPS, who was NEVER a party to the State court litigation, and who is under a 2013 consent judgment in Indiana (where it has stipulated to the forgery of loan documents, the ones specifically at issue in my case)never disclosed itself in State court or remediated the forged loan documents as was REQUIRED of them by the CJ. In essence, what the court is willfully ignoring, is that it is setting a precedent that the supplier of a defective product, one whom is under a consent judgment stipulating to such, and under obligation to remediate said defective product, can: 1.) Ignore the CJ 2.) Allow counsel to commit fraud on the state court 3.) Then try to hide behind Rooker Feldman doctrine as a bar to being held culpable in federal court. The problem here is the court is in direct conflict with its own ruling(s) in Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings & Iqbal- 780 F.3d 728, at 730 “What Johnson adds - what the defendants in this suit have failed to appreciate—is that federal courts retain jurisdiction to award damages for fraud that imposes extrajudicial injury. The Supreme Court drew that very line in Exxon Mobil ... Iqbal alleges that the defendants conducted a racketeering enterprise that predates the state court’s judgments ...but Exxon Mobil shows that the Rooker Feldman doctrine asks what injury the plaintiff asks the federal court to redress, not whether the injury is “intertwined” with something else …Because Iqbal seeks damages for activity that (he alleges) predates the state litigation and caused injury independently of it, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not block this suit. It must be reinstated.” So, as I already noted to others, I now have the chance to bring my case to SCOTUS; the ruling by Wood & Posner is flawed on numerous levels,BUT most troubling is the fact that the authors KNOW it's a flawed ruling and choose to ignore the flaws for one simple reason: The courts have decided to agree with former AG Eric Holder that national banks "Are too big to fail" and must win at any cost-even that of due process, case precedent, & the truth....Let's see if SCOTUS wants a bite at the apple.

  4. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

  5. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

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