ILNews

Judges disagree on proof-of-age issue

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Indiana Court of Appeals judges disagreed today about whether the state proved in its case a convicted child molester was 21 years old at the time the molestation occurred.

In Jamison C. Hudson v. State of Indiana, No. 82A04-0806-CR-355, Jamison Hudson appealed his convictions of Class A felony child molesting and Class C felony child molesting. Hudson was charged with three different specific acts of molesting his stepdaughter H.K. The trial court denied his motion in limine to exclude any evidence of sexual contact between the two for which he hadn't been charged.

In his appeal, Hudson challenged whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt he was at least 21 years old when he committed the child molesting, which is required to be convicted of Class A child molesting; and whether the court committed reversible error when it admitted evidence of his alleged other acts of child molesting for which he wasn't charged.

Citing Stanton v. State, 853 N.E.2d. 470, 474 (Ind. 2006), Judges Patricia Riley and Nancy Vaidik found the state failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain Hudson's conviction for Class A felony child molesting. The state failed to ask Hudson his birth date or ask specific questions of him as he testified to prove his age when he committed the crimes, wrote Judge Riley. The trial court relied on circumstantial evidence to convict him.

The facts in this case support a conviction for Class B felony child molesting, so the majority remanded to the trial court to enter his conviction as a Class B felony and sentence him accordingly.

Judge Carr Darden dissented in a separate opinion, writing the state could have avoided this current dilemma simply by asking Hudson's age when questioning him or his ex-wife. Judge Darden also wrote the court presumes a jury follows the instructions of the trial court, which would have told the jury that to convict Hudson of Class A felony child molesting, he would have to be at least 21 at the time of the act.

The judges unanimously affirmed the admission of H.K.'s testimony about a game she and Hudson would play that involved her touching his penis was a harmless error. Even though the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of Hudson's uncharged acts of child molesting, the court wrote the probable impact of the evidence on the jury in light of other evidence, was minor and harmless.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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