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Judges disagree on trust jurisdiction issue

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In a matter of first impression, Indiana Court of Appeals judges disagreed whether an Indiana probate court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction over a trust based in Virginia.

In the case In re the matter of: the Marvine W. Alford Trust, Joseph and Sarah Rogers v. J. Robert Lyons, as Trustee, No. 49A02-0805-CV-413, Chief Judge John Baker and Judge Paul Mathias agreed with a Marion Superior judge's dismissal of a petition to remove J. Robert Lyons as trustee for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The majority examined Marvine W. Alford's will and trust documents and ruled the trust was to be administered in accordance with Virginia laws, where Lyons lived.

Joseph and Sarah Rogers are the guardians of Shirley Rogers, who is the granddaughter of Alford. Alford had two children - Lyons and Marvine Mae Rogers, who is Shirley's mother. The Rogerses lived in Indiana and requested Lyons send a copy of Alford's will, the trust instrument, and a current statement of accounts after Marvine Mae's death. After Lyons delayed in sending the documents, the Rogerses filed a petition in the trial court to remove him as trustee, and sought an accounting and award of attorney fees.

Lyons filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(1), which the trial court granted.

The majority reviewed provisions of the Section 199 Restatement (Second) of Trusts, Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Indiana Code, and caselaw to help them affirm the trial court's dismissal of the complaint. In the majority's view, the provisions in Alford's will instructing Lyons "of Alexandria, Virginia" to become trustee expressed her intent that Lyons administer the trust in Virginia, wrote Chief Judge Baker. Any jurisdiction Indiana courts may have had over the trust ended when Alford's estate assets were transferred to Lyons as trustee to be held and administered in Virginia.

"Moreover, it is undisputed that Lyons has continuously and exclusively administered the Alford Trust and the assets in Virginia, and he has been a resident of Virginia since Alford executed her will," he wrote. As such, all claims regarding the administration are to be heard in Virginia courts.

Judge Elaine Brown dissented, writing that she doesn't believe the will's reference to "Robert Lyons, of Alexandria, Virginia" shows an intent the trust should be administered in Virginia. Judge Brown wrote the trial court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the case and she would hold the court erred by granting Lyons' motion to dismiss.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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