ILNews

Judges disagree over whether car ad implied drivability

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Court of Appeals was divided on whether an Indianapolis car dealership was entitled to summary judgment on a buyer’s lawsuit that made Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, Crime Victims Relief Act, and fraud claims.

Heather Kesling purchased a 1996 Mitsubishi Eclipse from Hubler Nissan for a little more than $2,300. She saw an advertisement describing the car as a “Sporty Car at a Great Value Price.” She test drove the car and saw it was not idling correctly. She asked the salesman if anything was wrong with the car, and he said it probably just needed a tune up.

A little more than a year later, she filed her lawsuit. She had it inspected more than two years later. The inspector noted the car was covered in dust, only had 44 more miles on the odometer as compared to the sales order, and that the car had numerous problems that he believed should have been discovered by the dealer during an inspection. The inspector believed the car was unsafe to drive.

The trial court granted Hubler’s motion for summary judgment.

In Heather N. Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc., 49A02-1111-CT-1031, Senior Judges John Sharpnack and Carr Darden found there to be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hubler made a representation in its advertisement that the car had performance, uses or benefits that it didn’t have and the dealer knew or should have known the car did not have those characteristics. The majority looked at the phrase “Sporty Car at a Great Value Price” and concluded a reasonable fact-finder could determine that Hubler implied the Eclipse was a good car for the price, and thus at a minimum, that it was safe to drive.

Judge Ezra Friedlander dissented, believing the advertisement did not run afoul of the Deceptive Consumer Sales Act and that the majority’s view is “simply unreasonable.” In his view, the phrase used conveys “virtually nothing” about the car to which it is attached and devoid of content relative to the car’s operating status.

The Court of Appeals also found issues of material fact on the fraud and Crime Victims Relief Act claims and remanded for further proceedings.

 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

ADVERTISEMENT