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Judges examine estate case involving will, self-proving clause

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Deciding on an issue of first impression regarding the proper execution of a person’s will, the state’s second-highest appeals court has determined the Indiana General Assembly doesn’t want validly signed wills and self-proving clauses to be set aside lightly.

The ruling comes in Estate of Wilgus S. Gibbs, Sr., No. 81A01-1011-ES-560, stemming from an estate dispute out of Union County dating to late 2009. Wilgus S. Gibbs Sr. had his son, Wilgus Gibbs Jr., contact an attorney to have a will prepared quickly because of a progressive lung disease. The son told the lawyer that his father wanted the will to stipulate that Gibbs Jr. would receive the entirety of Gibbs Sr.’s estate and the man’s three granddaughters would be excluded.

Gibbs Sr. signed the will and a self-proving clause at the end of the document, and those witnessing his signature found him to be of sound mind. A day later, he went to the law office and spoke with the lawyer’s secretary who’d witnessed him sign the document and thanked her. He also told her that he’d excluded the granddaughters because he had already given his daughter – their mother – substantial assets before she died in 2006.

The man’s health rapidly deteriorated and he died Jan. 8, 2010, and his son became the personal representative on the estate and executor of the will. Less than a month after Gibbs Sr. died, the granddaughters filed a complaint to contest the will. Both sides filed for summary judgment, and in October 2010, the trial court denied the granddaughters’ motion for summary judgment and granted the motion filed by Gibbs Jr.

On appeal, the granddaughters argued that it’s undisputed that Gibbs Sr. didn’t properly publish his will at the time he signed it, despite the signature of the self-proving clause. They cited testimony from two witnesses who saw Gibbs Sr. sign the document but couldn’t recall him specifically saying he knew it was his will or not.

But the claim of “undisputed” evidence of a failure to publish overlooks the self-providing clause, the appellate panel wrote. The judges noted that Indiana cases have previously explored what happens when inconsistencies exist between a self-proving clause to a will and subsequent witness testimony, and that a fact finder must resolve those discrepancies, but that none of that precedent involved the question of whether the discrepancies could be resolved by summary judgment.

The panel cited Indiana Code 29-1-7-13(c) that says a self-proving clause in a will creates a rebuttable presumption that the document was properly executed, and that publication of the will is one aspect of its execution.

“We conclude that this uncertainty or lack of memory as to the particulars of the will execution ceremony is insufficient as a matter of law to overcome the presumption, provided by the self-proving clause, that the will was properly executed,” Judge Michael Barnes wrote, noting that legislative history and court precedent in 2003 provides that finding.

Looking to appellate caselaw from Illinois in 1958 and 1970, the Indiana court panel found that precedent as persuasive for this state in determining the weight Hoosier lawmakers intended for self-proving clauses to have in the context of will validity.

The granddaughters lost on that claim, as well as their argument that Gibbs Sr. was unduly influenced to sign the will by his son. The appellate judges also determined the granddaughters waived their claim of mistake or fraud because they didn’t cite any relevant legal authority.


 

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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