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Judges find man's sentence violates statute

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The Indiana Court of Appeals relied on a case from the state’s highest court to rule on whether a term of imprisonment for the purposes of Indiana Code 35-50-3-1(b) includes both the executed and suspended portions of a sentence.

Joey Jennings challenged his conviction of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief and the sentence imposed by the Monroe Circuit Court – 180 days in jail with 150 suspended and 360 days of probation. Jennings didn’t think the state presented sufficient evidence to prove he was the person who slashed Cody Pope’s tire and scratched his truck. He also believed he was sentenced in excess of the statutory maximum sentence of 180 days because his terms of imprisonment and probation exceeded one year. This is prohibited under I.C. 35-50-3-1-(b).

The appellate court affirmed Jennings’ conviction in Joey Jennings v. State of Indiana, No. 53A01-1010-CR-541, finding that even though the evidence was circumstantial, it was enough to convict him. Witnesses heard the sound of air, like air brakes going off, and then Jennings’ car drove off quickly.

Regarding his sentence, the judges agreed with Jennings. They discussed several cases, including Beck v. State, 790 N.E.2d 520, 523 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), that have construed the phrase “term of imprisonment,” but could not be controlling authority. Instead, they relied on Mask v. State, 829 N.E.2d 932 (Ind. 2005), to find that Jennings’ sentence needed to be revised.  The justices reasoned that incarceration under I.C. 35-50-1-2(c) doesn’t mean the period of executed time alone, and there is always the possibility that someone could have their parole or probation revoked and returned to prison.

“In other words, the imposition of a suspended sentence leaves open the real possibility that an individual will be ‘sent to incarceration for some period’ before being released from any penal obligation,” the Mask court wrote.

“We conclude that Jennings’s term of imprisonment for the purposes of Indiana Code section 35-50-3-1(b) includes not only the thirty-day executed portion of his sentence, but also the 150-day suspended term. Thus, the trial court’s imposition of a 360-day term of probation in addition to Jennings’s 180-day term of imprisonment caused Jennings to serve more than one year of combined imprisonment and probation, in violation of Indiana Code section 35-50-3-1(b),” wrote Judge Paul Mathias. “We therefore remand this cause to the trial court for a redetermination of Jennings’s period of probation, not to exceed 185 days.”


 

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  1. Interesting that the new laws in criminal code all involve voter fraud

  2. I'm getting divorced and we have prenuptial and judge said it stands even though he made me sign it 2 days before wedding then I be c ame ill and left with nothing butbills

  3. No irony here, John. Conour’s clients are wise to him. Evidently you’ve missed discovery that disclosed Conour was aware he was caught with his hand in the cookie jar, actually many cookie jars, but continued to spend any monies he secured on himself and his lifestyle. Your theory is idealistic and assumes Conour has the soul of a good attorney and therefore he would take care of his clients. Conour has no soul. He greedily took awarded settlements from his disabled clients and spent it on his own edacious desires. You are naïve to think if he kept working he would put his fees into a restitution fund. He is who he is and has proven he will use any means to cheat and manipulate those who trust him and the judicial system that is supposed to protect them. Sorry John, you don’t send the fox back into the hen house after he’s caught devouring the hens. Conour can’t be trusted. He has no more honor than that fox.

  4. The court of appeals not only tries to rewrite or interpret the law to suit their fancy, now they choose play stupid as well. Every consideration must be given to pro se litigants, who are not held to the same standards as attorneys, as stated by,SCOTUS. I assume they didn't have a lawyer, since one wasn't mentioned and I strongly suggest thatb the rest of the, origional petitioners get back in there and fight for their rights.

  5. the irony of situations like this is that the clients whom conour cheated are the ones who should be pulling hardest for him to remain free and keep his law license, so they have some hopes of him paying back. really bury the guy deep and then there will be little hope of restitution

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