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Judges hold option to buy real estate valid

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The purchaser of real estate through an option executed years earlier didn’t make the option unenforceable against the owner’s estate by not tendering the purchase price when exercising his option to buy the land, the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded today.

The issue arose in Estate of Jane H. Collins v. T. William McKinney, No. 02A05-1004-EU-286, in which T. William McKinney had an option from 1990 with Jane and Robert Collins to purchase real estate from them on which there was a car dealership. McKinney had to deliver written notice of his intent to exercise the option to the personal representative of the estate within 90 days of the death of the last to die of Robert and Jane.

Jane died last, and upon learning this, McKinney sought to exercise the option by sending a letter to Ray Collins, the personal representative of Jane’s estate. The option didn’t include the purchase price. Ray never responded to McKinney and later claimed after McKinney filed suit that the lack of offering the purchase price made the option unenforceable.

McKinney filed a verified petition for specific performance to require the estate to sell the property. The trial court granted him summary judgment, ordered the estate to close the sale, and later awarded damages and attorney’s fees to McKinney.

The estate correctly argued on appeal that no rule has been mentioned in Indiana directly on the question of whether an option is binding only upon tender of performance, wrote Judge L. Mark Bailey. But Indiana law doesn’t require a tender of performance before an optionor is in default and specific cases in Indiana undercut the estate’s reliance on cases from other jurisdictions.

The judges citied Wolvos v. Meyer, 668 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. 1996), to affirm that proper notice is all that was required to exercise the option and McKinney gave proper notice to Ray.

The Court of Appeals also affirmed that McKinney could be awarded damages even though the court awarded specific performance, but they remanded for a recalculation of the amount McKinney is entitled to. The court also vacated the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to McKinney and remanded for the trial court to determine the amount of fees related to McKinney’s efforts to close on the property.

The judges affirmed the trial court in all other respects.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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