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Judges: Officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain man

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Because a man’s detention following a traffic stop wasn’t supported by reasonable suspicion, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed his drug conviction today.

Robert Segar believed the trial court abused its discretion by admitting marijuana into evidence that police found on him after an investigatory stop and detention. Police were responding to an anonymous tip that a burglary was in progress and the suspect was a white male in a dark coat or dark shirt. Officer Carl Grigsby saw Segar walking in the middle of the street near where the alleged robbery was happening and stopped him because he fit the description given by the caller.

Segar was cooperative, but placed in handcuffs. Police found out he was wanted for questioning about some burglaries, but he had no active warrants. Another officer conducted a pat-down search before placing him in the police car to take him to the station for questioning on those other robberies. That’s when police found a baggie that was later determined to contain marijuana.

Segar was charged and convicted of Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana over his objections to the admission of the drugs.

After finding that Segar did in fact make a timely objection to the admission of the marijuana, the Court of Appeals concluded in Robert Segar v. State of Indiana, No. 49A02-1003-CR-269, that the drug shouldn’t have been admitted into evidence. Police were responding to an anonymous tip and were unable to get any more information from the tipster beyond that there was a burglary in progress and the alleged burglar was white and wearing a dark top. The tipster hung up before giving a name.

The officers had little information on which to base a particularized suspicion of Segar, wrote Judge Margret Robb, and there was no way to test the reliability of the information provided by the tipster.

“If the tipster’s assertion of a burglary in progress had been corroborated, there would have been some reason to believe the tipster had inside knowledge potentially linking Segar to the illegality. However, there is nothing in the record to indicate whether a burglary actually happened at 3179 Normandy, let alone whether police verified the report before stopping Segar,” she wrote.

Segar’s actions before and during the stop weren’t suspicious. In addition, the reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what officers knew before, not after, conducting an investigatory stop. There was no indication that officers made a connection before Segar was stopped between the present reported burglary and whatever facts warranted his questioning regarding the previous burglaries, wrote Judge Robb.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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