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Judges reverse denial of motion to suppress

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The Indiana Court of Appeals overturned the denial of man’s motion to suppress, finding the traffic stop that resulted in his drunk driving arrest wasn’t supported by reasonable suspicion.

Greenwood Police Officer Greg Lengerich stopped Ryan Goens’ minivan for driving without any operable brake lights. During the stop, Lengerich smelled alcohol, gave Goens a warning citation for a vehicle equipment violation, and then conducted field sobriety tests. Goens failed them and blew a 0.21 after taking a certified breath test. He was charged with five counts relating to driving while intoxicated.

He filed a motion to suppress, arguing his minivan had two operable stop lamps and was in compliance with Title 9 of the Indiana Constitution. The officer was unable to attend the hearing and said in his deposition testimony that he couldn’t remember whether only one stop lamp wasn’t working or if all the stop lamps were out. Also at the hearing, Goens’ passenger testified he saw another officer move the minivan to a parking lot and that the only brake light out was on the rear passenger’s side.

Even though the trial court found two stop lamps were lighted, it denied his motion to suppress. The judge concluded it was reasonable for Lengerich to stop the minivan to inform the driver that a light was burned out.

On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the denial in Ryan J. Goens v. State of Indiana, No. 41A01-1006-CR-277. The state argued that Lengerich properly stopped Goens because his minivan wasn’t in compliance with Indiana Code sections 9-19-6-17 or 9-21-7-1, the “good working order statute.” Goens claimed his minivan had two operating stop lamps and was in compliance with I.C. Section 9-19-6-17(a).

After examining the statutes, the judges determined Goens’ vehicle was in compliance with Section 17(a). They read that statute, along with I.C. chapter 9-19-6, to rule the statutes require at least one, but only one, functioning stop lamp. The trial court concluded that two of the three lamps on Goens’ minivan were working, so there was no violation of I.C. Section 9-16-6-17 to support reasonable suspicion for the stop, wrote Judge Paul Mathias.

The judges also rejected the state’s argument that his vehicle wasn’t in “good working order.” Stop lamps aren’t specifically referenced in Article 21. The purpose of the statute is to require vehicles traveling on darkened roads to have operating headlights and taillights so that others can see the car. After examining the statutes, they decided that a stop or brake lamp isn’t the same equipment as, doesn’t serve the same function as, and is regulated differently from a tail lamp under Indiana statutes.
 
“Furthermore, as set forth above, sections 9-19-6-6 and 17 only require at least one functioning stop lamp. Therefore, if the good working order statute is applied to stop lamps, Goens’s vehicle was in good working order as required by section 9-21-7-1 because two of the three stop lamps on the vehicle were functioning properly at the time of the stop,” wrote Judge Mathias. “For all of these reasons, we conclude that Goens did not operate his vehicle in violation of either section 9-19-6-17 or section 9-21-7-1.”

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  • See Freeman
    Oh my; don't we have fun in Indiana. What do you now tell Law Enforcement.

    Freman v. State 904 NE2

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  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

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