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Judges rule on legal malpractice action

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The Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that a man has standing to pursue his legal malpractice action, although issues of material fact preclude him from summary judgment as to the attorney’s liability for malpractice.

In Charles Price v. Delmar Kuchaes, No. 45A04-1007-CT-467, attorney Delmar Kuchaes claimed his former client Charles Price didn’t have standing to sue him for legal malpractice stemming from his representation in the Prices’ suit after Charles’ wife contracted polio after being exposed to someone recently vaccinated.

After Price lost his claim for loss of consortium due to failure to comply with notice requirements under Indiana law, Price filed a legal malpractice action against Kuchaes. The Prices then filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2007, but didn’t inform the bankruptcy court of this malpractice suit until they filed an amended petition in 2009. The bankruptcy case was later dismissed.

At a hearing, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Price as to Kuchaes’ liability for malpractice, but denied summary judgment on the amount of damages. It held Cathy Price’s injury was battery under Indiana law and Kuchaes failed to act as a reasonably prudent lawyer, and that failure was the proximate cause of damages incurred by Price. The trial court later granted Kuchaes’ dispositive motion for summary judgment. Both sides appealed.

Kuchaes argued Price doesn’t have standing to maintain the legal malpractice action because when he filed for bankruptcy, the trustee became the one to pursue the claim. The judges found that when the bankruptcy was dismissed in July 2009, that returned ownership of the action to Price, so he has standing to pursue his legal malpractice action.

Although the judges found it troubling that Price didn’t disclose his malpractice action initially in his bankruptcy filing, they concluded as a matter of law that the malpractice action isn’t barred by judicial estoppel as Kuchaes argued. They reversed summary judgment to Kuchaes and remanded for further proceedings on this issue.

The judges also concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Price as to Kuchaes’ liability for malpractice. Price didn’t show that if Kuchaes had properly pursued the loss of consortium claim against the vaccine manufacturers he would have prevailed. There are also issues of material fact as to whether Price’s loss of consortium claims against the vaccine manufacturers and medical defendants would have been successful had Kuchaes properly pursued them.

The appellate court affirmed the denial of summary judgment for Price as to damages, and remanded for further proceedings.

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  1. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  2. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  3. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

  4. Why in the world would someone need a person to correct a transcript when a realtime court reporter could provide them with a transcript (rough draft) immediately?

  5. This article proved very enlightening. Right ahead of sitting the LSAT for the first time, I felt a sense of relief that a score of 141 was admitted to an Indiana Law School and did well under unique circumstances. While my GPA is currently 3.91 I fear standardized testing and hope that I too will get a good enough grade for acceptance here at home. Thanks so much for this informative post.

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