ILNews

Judges uphold man's remanded drug sentence

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a defendant’s argument that the District Court violated the cross-appeal rule when it based his new sentence on remand on evidence that wasn’t relied upon at his first sentencing hearing.

Martin Avila appealed his original 396-month sentence for drug offenses, and the 7th Circuit ordered him to be re-sentenced because the District Court relied on the wrong base offense level. The Circuit Court remanded with instructions to “consider the Guidelines range that properly reflects the amount of drugs Avila distributed.”

At his first sentencing, the probation officer attributed 24,234 kilograms of marijuana to him, which would lead to a base offense level of 36, not 38 as the report stated. On remand, the government submitted an addendum to the pre-sentence report that included the drug quantities reflected in the trial testimony of Avila’s co-conspirators that the probation officer excluded from the first report.

By using the new increased amount of drugs as stated at trial, it led to a base level offense of 38, to which Avila didn’t object. The District judge then sentenced him to 365 months in prison.

In United States of America v. Martin Avila, No. 09-2681, Avila argued the judge should have used the original drug quantities, which would have produced a base offense level of 36 and a guideline range of 235 to 293 months. He relied on Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008), to argue that the District Court can’t on remand correct a guidelines-calculation error that the government didn’t raise on cross appeal.

But his reliance on that case is misplaced, the 7th Circuit per curiam opinion stated. The appellate court remanded the case so that the District judge could re-sentence him using the correct offense level. In addition, the government didn’t add a new sentencing request because it always argued his base offense level is 38. Since that’s the base offense level the District judge initially used, the government had no reason to cross-appeal.

“Finally, Greenlaw does not bar a district judge from imposing the same sentence on remand, 554 U.S. at 253-54, and, in any case, the judge sentenced Avila to 365 months imprisonment — 31 months less than his initial 396-month sentence,” the judges wrote.

They also pointed out that the judges didn’t limit the remand to re-sentencing based on the drug quantity listed in the initial pre-sentence report, but instructed the lower court to sentence Avila based on the amount of drugs he distributed.

“Using only evidence from the original trial proceedings, the district court did precisely that. The district court thus acted within the scope of the remand order and committed no error, plain or otherwise.”

 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  2. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  3. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

  4. Why in the world would someone need a person to correct a transcript when a realtime court reporter could provide them with a transcript (rough draft) immediately?

  5. This article proved very enlightening. Right ahead of sitting the LSAT for the first time, I felt a sense of relief that a score of 141 was admitted to an Indiana Law School and did well under unique circumstances. While my GPA is currently 3.91 I fear standardized testing and hope that I too will get a good enough grade for acceptance here at home. Thanks so much for this informative post.

ADVERTISEMENT