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Justice wants attorney suspended longer

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The Indiana Supreme Court couldn’t agree on the appropriate sanction for an attorney who engaged in an improper ex parte communication with a judge, leaving one justice to argue for at least a 90-day suspension.

The justices voted 4-1 to suspend Jane G. Cotton for 30 days with automatic reinstatement. The justices found that she violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 3.5(b) by engaging in misconduct by having an improper ex parte communication with a judge and Rule 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Cotton began representing a wife in her protection order case and a divorce case. Before Cotton became the wife’s attorney, the wife filed a petition for a protection order in which she wrote several address that the husband should stay away from. One of those addresses was for the parties’ “South Central Way Property.” Magistrate Judge Stephen D. Clase crossed out all the hand-written addresses and initialed the changes to indicate they were intentional.

The South Central property was sold at a tax sale and the husband’s attorney petitioned for and was granted a motion to allow him to remove his personal property so it wouldn’t be lost to the tax sale purchaser. This happened about the time Cotton started representing the wife. She went to the courthouse to talk to the magistrate about the order of protection with the crossed-out addresses, but the only one available was Judge Thomas Clem. She spoke with him off the record, said the South Central property had been left off inadvertently and the judge wrote that address on a photocopy of the order for protection. He didn’t sign or initial it; Cotton later took the court’s seal and impressed it on the order.

Cotton never informed the husband or his attorney of this change. When the husband went to the property to get his belongings, the wife called the police and he was forced to spend more than $1,000 petitioning for a second motion to remove his property.

The hearing officer found no facts in aggravation and found the following facts in mitigation: Cotton doesn’t have a prior record of discipline; her client’s mental illness may have contributed to a communication of inaccurate or incomplete facts to her; and Cotton was motivated by a genuine concern for the welfare of her client. Cotton tendered the $1,275 to the commission for payment of restitution to the husband, which the justices order be released to the husband.

“The accuracy of documents utilized by a tribunal in a proceeding is of the utmost importance to the administration of justice, and fraudulent alteration of such documents by an officer of the court is therefore serious misconduct,” states the per curiam opinion In the Matter of Jane G. Cotton, No. 48S00-0910-DI-497.

Justice Frank Sullivan wanted a more severe sanction, arguing based on previous disciplinary actions of a similar nature, Cotton should have been suspended for at least 90 days.

Cotton’s suspension is effective Feb. 7, 2011.

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

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  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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