ILNews

Justices accept two cases

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Supreme Court has granted transfer in two cases, one examining medical malpractice liability evidence for damages and another examining how Marion County’s mass tort litigation rules impact the overall goal of orderly and speedy justice in an asbestos case.

At its private conference on Friday, the justices denied transfer in 29 appeals and accepted two cases – Stephen W. Robertson, Indiana Commissioner of Insurance as Administrator of the Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund, et al. v. B.O., a minor, by his parents and next friends, Lisa and Kevin C. Ort, No. 49S04-1111-CT-671; and Sharon Gill, on her own behalf and on behalf of the estate of Gale Gill, deceased v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., No. 49S05-1111-CV-672.

In B.O., the Indiana Court of Appeals in May ruled on an issue of first impression about medical malpractice liability evidence being introduced to determine damages even after someone enters into a settlement with the healthcare provider on that underlying claim. A Marion Superior judge last year granted partial summary judgment for B.O. on grounds that the fund’s expert witness testimony couldn’t be introduced. But on interlocutory appeal, an appellate panel reversed that ruling based on language in the state’s Medical Malpractice Act and recent guidance from the Indiana Supreme Court in Atterholt v. Herbst, 907 N.E.2d 528 (Ind. 2009), which re-evaluated some precedent and held that the fund may introduce evidence of a claimant’s pre-existing risk of harm if it’s relevant to establishing the amount of damages.

The justices also accepted Gill, a case the Indiana Court of Appeals decided in December 2010. The appellate court found that a Marion County trial court shouldn’t have adhered to its local rule because it failed to achieve “the ultimate end of orderly and speedy justice,” when deciding that a woman’s claim against her deceased husband’s former employer was time-barred by a 10-year statute of limitations. Sharon Gill sued the contractor on claims that her husband had been exposed to asbestos on the job and that he died from a related disease. The appellate court noted its concern with the application of the Marion Circuit Court’s mass tort litigation rules and instructed the court not “blindly adhere” to all of the local rules without keeping the ultimate goal of orderly and speedy justice in mind.
 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

ADVERTISEMENT