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Justices address habitual-offender statute

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The Indiana Supreme Court tackled the state’s habitual-offender statute today in two separate rulings, finding that an instant offense of drug dealing, coupled with a prior conviction, can qualify a defendant as a habitual offender.

In Andre Peoples v. State of Indiana, No. 79S02-0912-CR-549, Andre Peoples argued his instant offense of dealing in cocaine couldn’t be used in calculating the total number of unrelated felony convictions a person has for drug dealing. Peoples had prior unrelated convictions in Illinois for forgery and dealing in cocaine.

The trial court found Peoples was a habitual offender and sentenced him to an additional 10 years on top of his 10-year sentence for the Class B felony dealing in cocaine.  

The justices examined Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8 and found subsections (b) and (d) work in concert to assure that all offenders who have accumulated three felony convictions, and at least one is a felony drug conviction, are treated alike, regardless of the order in which they were accumulated. They rejected Peoples’ interpretation that a person with an instant felony conviction for forgery and two prior felony drug convictions would be eligible for the enhancement, but someone whose prior convictions are forgery and a drug offense, and whose instant felony conviction is for a drug offense wouldn’t be eligible for enhancement.

“When the State filed Defendant’s habitual offender charge, he had accumulated one felony drug conviction. But we do not read the language of subsection (a) to preclude the State from filing habitual offender charges with respect to a defendant who, if convicted on the underlying charges, will have accumulated two unrelated felony drug convictions by the time habitual offender proceedings commence,” wrote Justice Frank Sullivan.

In Myron Owens v. State of Indiana, No. 49S02-0910-CR-429, the justices held that a conspiracy-to-deal conviction is not equivalent to a dealing conviction for the purposes of the habitual offender statute. Owens was convicted of Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Class B felony possession of cocaine and other charges. He was found to be a habitual offender based on his prior convictions of dealing in cocaine and conspiracy to deal.

The statute only counts certain offenses as prior felonies. If a defendant’s instant offense falls under Chapter 16-42-19 or 35-48-4, and isn’t specified in I.C. 35-50-2-2(b)(4), then the state can only seek to enhance the sentence if the defendant has two or more unrelated convictions for a dealing offense identified in subsection 8(b)(3)(C) of the habitual-offender statute. Conspiracy to deal isn’t explicitly set out in that subsection, wrote Justice Theodore Boehm.

The justices agreed with the reasoning in Huff v. State that because conspiracy to deal is a separate offense and not listed with dealing among the nonsuspendable offenses, conspiracy to deal is not suspendable under Indiana Code. They declined to equate conspiracy to deal with the dealing offenses found in subsection 8(b)(3)(C).

But because of Owens’ prior conviction of dealing in cocaine paired with his instant dealing conviction, he can be sentenced with a habitual-offender enhancement, wrote Justice Boehm. The justices affirmed his convictions and sentences in the instant case.
 

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  1. Such things are no more elections than those in the late, unlamented Soviet Union.

  2. It appears the police and prosecutors are allowed to change the rules halfway through the game to suit themselves. I am surprised that the congress has not yet eliminated the right to a trial in cases involving any type of forensic evidence. That would suit their foolish law and order police state views. I say we eliminate the statute of limitations for crimes committed by members of congress and other government employees. Of course they would never do that. They are all corrupt cowards!!!

  3. Poor Judge Brown probably thought that by slavishly serving the godz of the age her violations of 18th century concepts like due process and the rule of law would be overlooked. Mayhaps she was merely a Judge ahead of her time?

  4. in a lawyer discipline case Judge Brown, now removed, was presiding over a hearing about a lawyer accused of the supposedly heinous ethical violation of saying the words "Illegal immigrant." (IN re Barker) http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-discipline-2013-55S00-1008-DI-429.pdf .... I wonder if when we compare the egregious violations of due process by Judge Brown, to her chiding of another lawyer for politically incorrectness, if there are any conclusions to be drawn about what kind of person, what kind of judge, what kind of apparatchik, is busy implementing the agenda of political correctness and making off-limits legit advocacy about an adverse party in a suit whose illegal alien status is relevant? I am just asking the question, the reader can make own conclsuion. Oh wait-- did I use the wrong adjective-- let me rephrase that, um undocumented alien?

  5. of course the bigger questions of whether or not the people want to pay for ANY bussing is off limits, due to the Supreme Court protecting the people from DEMOCRACY. Several decades hence from desegregation and bussing plans and we STILL need to be taking all this taxpayer money to combat mostly-imagined "discrimination" in the most obviously failed social program of the postwar period.

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