ILNews

Justices address judicial-temperance presumption

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Supreme Court used an opinion Thursday to reaffirm the limitation described in Fletcher v. State on the judicial-temperance presumption.

Joshua Konopasek appealed his Class C felony conviction of battery causing serious bodily injury. At his trial, Konopasek claimed he pushed the victim in self defense, but he didn’t cause the victim’s broken jaw. On direct examination, Konopasek’s attorney elicited testimony from Konopasek regarding his probationary status; on cross-examination, the state asked Konopasek “And you’ve got quite a bit of time hanging over your head?” Konopasek objected, but the judge allowed the question.

On appeal, Konopasek argued, among other things, that the trial court abused its discretion when admitting evidence elicited by the state regarding his probation. The Indiana Court of Appeals found the court shouldn’t have admitted the evidence, but it was a harmless error. The judges concluded that Konopasek didn’t overcome the judicial-temperance presumption – the presumption that in a bench trial, the judge will disregard inadmissible and irrelevant evidence.

The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to address the admissibility of the evidence in question and to reaffirm Fletcher v. State, 264 Ind. 132, 340 N.E.2d 771 (1976), as it relates to the judicial-temperance presumption. The justices affirmed the Court of Appeals on the remaining issues and affirmed Konopasek’s conviction and sentence.

In Joshua Konopasek v. State of Indiana, No. 25S03-1012-CR-669, the Supreme Court reviewed the admission of Konopasek’s testimony on the length of his suspended sentence only, and only considered the relevancy of the testimony in question. The justices found the testimony was a classic “he said-he said” case, wrote Justice Steven David, and evidence impeaching Konopasek was significantly relevant. They also held the probative value of the evidence wasn’t outweighed by unfair prejudice.

Turning to Fletcher, Justice David explained that the Supreme Court set parameters on the judicial-temperance presumption in cases where a defendant makes a specific objection to the admission of evidence. The justices decided not to apply the judicial-temperance presumption to the instant case because the evidence in question was relevant and admissible.

The justices then went on to reaffirm the limits on the presumption as explained in Fletcher and clarified the interplay between the presumption and harmless-error analysis.

“On appeal, when a defendant challenges the admissibility of evidence at a bench trial and the evidence in fact was inadmissible, the judicial-temperance presumption comes into play. One way a defendant can overcome the presumption is by showing the trial court admitted the evidence over a specific objection, as in Fletcher,” wrote the justice. “If a defendant does overcome the presumption, the reviewing court then engages in full harmless-error analysis: the error is harmless if the ‘reviewing court is satisfied that the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt so that there is no substantial likelihood that the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction.’ Meadows v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1112, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). If a defendant cannot overcome the presumption, a reviewing court presumes the trial court disregarded the improper evidence and accordingly finds the error harmless.”
 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Why in the world would someone need a person to correct a transcript when a realtime court reporter could provide them with a transcript (rough draft) immediately?

  2. If the end result is to simply record the spoke word, then perhaps some day digital recording may eventually be the status quo. However, it is a shallow view to believe the professional court reporter's function is to simply report the spoken word and nothing else. There are many aspects to being a professional court reporter, and many aspects involved in producing a professional and accurate transcript. A properly trained professional steno court reporter has achieved a skill set in a field where the average dropout rate in court reporting schools across the nation is 80% due to the difficulty of mastering the necessary skills. To name just a few "extras" that a court reporter with proper training brings into a courtroom or a deposition suite; an understanding of legal procedure, technology specific to the legal profession, and an understanding of what is being said by the attorneys and litigants (which makes a huge difference in the quality of the transcript). As to contracting, or anti-contracting the argument is simple. The court reporter as governed by our ethical standards is to be the independent, unbiased individual in a deposition or courtroom setting. When one has entered into a contract with any party, insurance carrier, etc., then that reporter is no longer unbiased. I have been a court reporter for over 30 years and I echo Mr. Richardson's remarks that I too am here to serve.

  3. A competitive bid process is ethical and appropriate especially when dealing with government agencies and large corporations, but an ethical line is crossed when court reporters in Pittsburgh start charging exorbitant fees on opposing counsel. This fee shifting isn't just financially biased, it undermines the entire justice system, giving advantages to those that can afford litigation the most. It makes no sense.

  4. "a ttention to detail is an asset for all lawyers." Well played, Indiana Lawyer. Well played.

  5. I have a appeals hearing for the renewal of my LPN licenses and I need an attorney, the ones I have spoke to so far want the money up front and I cant afford that. I was wondering if you could help me find one that takes payments or even a pro bono one. I live in Indiana just north of Indianapolis.

ADVERTISEMENT