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Justices: Anders withdrawals not allowed

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The Indiana Supreme Court has rejected a procedure set up by the nation's top court more than four decades ago that allows attorneys to withdraw from criminal appeals they deem frivolous. Our justices say it's practically and financially more efficient to simply proceed with an appeal and let that process play out.

Deciding on a case that's moot but presents an issue of great public concern and "significantly implicates appellate practice and procedure, constitutional rights, legal ethics, and judicial resource management," Indiana's justices ruled unanimously today on Bryan G. Mosley v. State of Indiana, No. 49S02-0812-CR-643. They affirmed the criminal defendant's misdemeanor conviction for resisting law enforcement and sentence of 363 days of probation, which the Court of Appeals had done last year.

But more significantly, the justices tackled an issue that's divided the nation's state and federal courts and has brought debate in Indiana since the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The ruling established protocol permitting appointed counsel to withdraw from "frivolous" criminal appeals by filing a brief - now dubbed an "Anders brief" - with the appellate court. That procedure requires public defenders to review the record, brief the court on any possible meritorious issues, and give the appeals court a chance to fully examine whether the case has merit and the attorney can withdraw.

In the Mosley case, the Court of Appeals observed that an appeal shouldn't be found in every case and that attorneys can use the Anders brief procedure.

"Trying to create issues where there are none leads to the sort of perfunctory, baseless brief we have before us today," the appellate panel wrote last year. "When there are no meritorious arguments to be made, the better approach is to file a brief in accordance with our decision in Packer v. State, 777 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), which outlines the proper procedure for such a situation."

That was the basis for the Indiana Supreme Court acceptance of the case, which now tosses out the procedure being used here.

"Overall, Anders is cumbersome and inefficient. ... An attorney who withdraws pursuant to Anders must still review the record, complete at least some legal research, consult and advise the client, and draft a brief for submission to the Court of Appeals," Indiana Justice Theodore Boehm wrote. "Requiring counsel to submit an ordinary appellate brief for the first time - no matter how frivolous counsel regards the claims to be - is quicker, simpler, and places fewer demands on the appellate courts."

Turning to rulings from various other jurisdictions out-of-state and on past cases where Indiana justices had commented on the Anders issue, the Indiana high court noted that it also finds fairness issues with the procedure because it flags a case as meritless and creates a more perfunctory review by appellate judges.

"We understand the frustration of the Court of Appeals in receiving underdeveloped briefs and poorly substantiated arguments," the justices wrote. "We also recognize that our decision to prohibit Anders withdrawals may in some cases perpetuate the filing of 'perfunctory' appeals. But in a direct appeal, a convicted defendant is entitled to a review by the judiciary, not by overworked and underpaid public defenders."

The Indiana justices pointed out that the federal justices in 2000 said states could craft their own policies to supplement or offer alternatives to Anders for indigent criminal appeals, and outlined how Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 includes a comment permitting an attorney to proceed on a defense that might be unjust but not preventing him or her of defending someone charged with a crime. Bryan G. Mosley in this appeal used that conduct rule to make state constitutional claims against the Anders withdrawal, but the Hoosier justices didn't bite and based their opinion here on the court's "supervisory authority over matters of appellate procedure and professional responsibility."

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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