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Justices: Belated appeals rule doesn’t apply to probation revocations

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The Indiana Supreme Court has put its stamp of approval on an intermediate appellate panel’s ruling last year, finding that the state’s existing Post-Conviction Rule 2 that allows for belated appeals on certain criminal cases doesn’t apply to probation revocations.

In a two-page per curiam opinion in Edward Dawson v. State of Indiana, No. 49S02-1103-CR-176, the justices unanimously granted transfer on a Marion County case the Indiana Court of Appeals had decided Dec. 17, 2010.

Marion Superior Judge Robert Altice had imposed an eight-year suspended sentence with three years probation for the defendant, who’d pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery and carrying a handgun without a license. The judge later revoked his probation and sentenced him to six years after a probation violation, but he didn’t file a motion to correct error or any appeal notice within 30 days as required. Dawson said he later learned generally about his right to appeal after meeting a law clerk with the Indiana Youth Center, and eight months following the revocation order he asked for a belated appeal. Judge Altice allowed it “outright” and permitted a hearing, but confirmed the six-year sanction he’d ordered.

The Court of Appeals found that Post-Conviction Rule 2 is not available for belated appeals of probation revocation orders and dismissed the appeal, and now the justices have affirmed that decision.

“We agree with the Court of Appeals’ analysis that the sanction imposed when probation is revoked does not qualify as a ‘sentence’ under the Rule, and therefore Dawson is not an ‘eligible defendant,’” the per curiam opinion reads. ”Accordingly, we grant transfer and adopt and incorporate by reference the opinion of the Court of Appeals under Appellate Rule 58(A)(1).”

This is the first time the state’s highest court has explicitly determined whether and to what extent Post-Conviction Rule 2 applies to probation revocation orders, either by opinion or rule amendment even after the intermediate appellate court had decided that matter in Glover v. State, 684 N.E.2d 542, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).

Justices addressed PCR 2 and probation revocation hearings in Cooper v. State, 917 N.E.2d 667, 673 (Ind. 2009), but the court ruled that because Cooper didn’t petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal, the case wasn’t an appropriate vehicle to resolve the question of whether probation revocation orders are appealable under PCR 2.

That question is now resolved.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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