ILNews

Justices clarify jury taint, mistrial standards

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Because the Indiana Court of Appeals cited three different mistrial standards in a man’s appeal of the denial of his motion for a mistrial, the Indiana Supreme Court took his case to clarify its precedent for trial courts to use to determine whether a mistrial is a cure for a jury taint.

Five days into Ernesto Ramirez’s murder and criminal gang activity trial, Juror 282 informed the court about a shooting at her home the night before. The juror said her neighbor heard gun shots in the apartment above her and “told them I was a jury member in a case.” She also told other jurors about the incident. She was removed from the jury, but the trial court denied Ramirez’s motion for a mistrial. The judge found the jury could remain impartial.

“Federal and Indiana precedent has narrowed the presumption of prejudice to apply in cases where the defendants show more than just potential taint – but some Indiana precedent, including our own, has applied that presumption inconsistently,” Justice Loretta Rush wrote in Ernesto Roberto Ramirez v. State of Indiana, 45S05-1305-CR-331. “We now clarify its precise scope, and reiterate the proper process for trial courts to address jury taint in the courtroom. We hold that no presumption applies in Ramirez’s case, and that the trial court’s approach in addressing his allegation of jury taint was correct.”

Rush pointed to previous cases in which Indiana courts have cited the presumption of prejudice but didn’t follow it. One court even concluded that the presumption of prejudice no longer existed in Indiana. But the presumption of prejudice does remain under Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954), and Indiana Supreme Court precedent.

“Trial courts should apply the presumption of prejudice analysis of Currin (v. State) in the context of the procedures we established in Lindsey (v. State),” Rush wrote. “Trial courts must immediately investigate suspected jury taint by thoroughly interviewing jurors collectively and individually, if necessary.

“Once defendants move for mistrial, the trial courts should assess whether or not there is enough evidence to meet the two-part showing under Currin. If so, then the presumption of prejudice applies and the burden shifts to the State to prove harmless error. If not, then the trial courts should determine whether a juror’s misconduct was gross or probably harmed the defendant.”  

Ramirez failed to show that Juror 282’s apartment incident was related to his case. She was not even sure if her status as a juror trigged the apartment shooting. Her own narration strongly suggests that no one even entered her apartment. The justices affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to uphold Ramirez’s sentence.

Justice Mark Massa concurred in result, writing that the majority attempted to create order by carving out a new analytical framework and questioning one of the high court’s prior decisions: Griffin v. State, 754 N.E.2d 899, (Ind. 2001). He believes the justices can synthesize the three seminal federal decisions on this issue – Remmer, Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), and articulate a reasonable rule without “doing violence to our precedent.”
 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Poor Judge Brown probably thought that by slavishly serving the godz of the age her violations of 18th century concepts like due process and the rule of law would be overlooked. Mayhaps she was merely a Judge ahead of her time?

  2. in a lawyer discipline case Judge Brown, now removed, was presiding over a hearing about a lawyer accused of the supposedly heinous ethical violation of saying the words "Illegal immigrant." (IN re Barker) http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-discipline-2013-55S00-1008-DI-429.pdf .... I wonder if when we compare the egregious violations of due process by Judge Brown, to her chiding of another lawyer for politically incorrectness, if there are any conclusions to be drawn about what kind of person, what kind of judge, what kind of apparatchik, is busy implementing the agenda of political correctness and making off-limits legit advocacy about an adverse party in a suit whose illegal alien status is relevant? I am just asking the question, the reader can make own conclsuion. Oh wait-- did I use the wrong adjective-- let me rephrase that, um undocumented alien?

  3. of course the bigger questions of whether or not the people want to pay for ANY bussing is off limits, due to the Supreme Court protecting the people from DEMOCRACY. Several decades hence from desegregation and bussing plans and we STILL need to be taking all this taxpayer money to combat mostly-imagined "discrimination" in the most obviously failed social program of the postwar period.

  4. You can put your photos anywhere you like... When someone steals it they know it doesn't belong to them. And, a man getting a divorce is automatically not a nice guy...? That's ridiculous. Since when is need of money a conflict of interest? That would mean that no one should have a job unless they are already financially solvent without a job... A photographer is also under no obligation to use a watermark (again, people know when a photo doesn't belong to them) or provide contact information. Hey, he didn't make it easy for me to pay him so I'll just take it! Well heck, might as well walk out of the grocery store with a cart full of food because the lines are too long and you don't find that convenient. "Only in Indiana." Oh, now you're passing judgement on an entire state... What state do you live in? I need to characterize everyone in your state as ignorant and opinionated. And the final bit of ignorance; assuming a photo anyone would want is lucky and then how much does your camera have to cost to make it a good photo, in your obviously relevant opinion?

  5. Seventh Circuit Court Judge Diane Wood has stated in “The Rule of Law in Times of Stress” (2003), “that neither laws nor the procedures used to create or implement them should be secret; and . . . the laws must not be arbitrary.” According to the American Bar Association, Wood’s quote drives home this point: The rule of law also requires that people can expect predictable results from the legal system; this is what Judge Wood implies when she says that “the laws must not be arbitrary.” Predictable results mean that people who act in the same way can expect the law to treat them in the same way. If similar actions do not produce similar legal outcomes, people cannot use the law to guide their actions, and a “rule of law” does not exist.

ADVERTISEMENT