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Justices consider 'youth program center' issue

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Walter Whatley isn't disputing the fact that he was in possession of cocaine and that he should be held accountable for that.

Instead, the Indianapolis defendant argues that he shouldn't have been convicted of Class A felony cocaine possession, which is what he was charged with given that he had the cocaine within 1,000 feet of a "youth program center" or a church near his home, where police arrested him after finding more than three grams of the illegal substance on him.

Taking his case to the Indiana Supreme Court, Whatley's attorney contends the statutory phrase of "youth program center" isn't adequately defined to include a church and it's constitutionally vague, meaning he should have received a Class C felony conviction that would have meant two to eight years rather than 20 to 50 in prison.

In its unanimous May decision, the Court of Appeals reversed Whatley's conviction on grounds that he'd been near a church, not a youth program center, and directed the trial court to enter a lesser Class C felony conviction. Specifically, the appellate panel held that the church wasn't converted into a youth program center by reason of holding faith-based activities for children, such as bi-weekly Girl Scout troop meetings and youth mentoring.

"The church was not a youth program center," the court wrote. "It remained a church notwithstanding the incidental activities not solely religious in nature."

Indiana Code Section 35-41-1-29 defines a youth program center as a "building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs or services for persons less than eighteen (18) years of age."

The question of this case hinges on what that definition means, and whether it's constitutionally vague on its face or when no visible notice marks a building as a youth program center. During arguments, attorneys told justices that the trial record isn't clear if Whatley knew about the church's other focuses on youth, but it appears that no signage marked the Robinson Community Church as a youth program center.

State defender Victoria Bailey told justices that it not only mattered about having a sign marking the church or building as a youth program center, but also what the activity was happening inside. She said a factual dispute could be found in the verbiage requiring a "regular or recurring" activity, and that might not mean the same thing for everyone. People need to have the opportunity to know that a facility is a youth program center, so they can comply with the law, she said.

Justice Robert D. Rucker asked if the same rationale would apply to a school - that it wouldn't be enough to just know it was a school, but that the state would have to prove that the activities inside constituted those of a school. Bailey responded that a sign designating it as a school wouldn't be enough.

"The burden is on the state to prove each and every element of the offense," she said. "The statutory definitions for these various locations... are what matters."

On the state's behalf, attorney Ann Goodwin said the Court of Appeals' logic in this case is flawed because the panel used the basis of zoning law rather than what this particular statute says.

Justice Rucker asked about whether the definition would apply to a private residence where a family regularly has neighborhood kids over to study or stay the night. Goodwin said that wouldn't be considered a youth program center because it doesn't take in a common sense approach evident in the legislature's intent.

"A church is not per se a place where children gather, although I believe you are correct that as a practical matter, if cases go forward using churches, that the state will be likely to prove that," she said.

The statute doesn't apply to private residences, she added, and there isn't a knowledge component here. The legislature meant this to be a catchall provision to protect these places, she said,

Justice Theodore R. Boehm quickly responded to her point, saying, "It seems to me that you both want to embrace the statutory definition and also run away from it. In other words, your common sense point is correct but if you take the statutory definition then the Statehouse would become a youth center.... Yet you quite properly say how would any citizen understand that this is such a building? So there is a notice component somewhere."

He went on to grill Goodwin about the state applying the law to him, if he were to conduct youth activities in his home at 3 a.m. without anyone's knowledge outside of those there. Why wouldn't that apply, he asked?

"I do not believe Mr. Whatley's position that this is a slippery slope leading to encompassing the entire zone of Marion County," Goodwin said. "There is real guidance in the statute."

Bailey said there's a real danger of interpreting this case in a way that's overbroad, and could encompass areas such as malls, arcades, private homes - that's how the statute reads and that's why it's not clear, she said.

"All of those places, under this statute, are buildings or structures that offer programs or services, she said.

Justices have taken the case under advisement.

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  1. Bob Leonard killed two people named Jennifer and Dion Longworth. There were no Smiths involved.

  2. Being on this journey from the beginning has convinced me the justice system really doesn't care about the welfare of the child. The trial court judge knew the child belonged with the mother. The father having total disregard for the rules of the court. Not only did this cost the mother and child valuable time together but thousands in legal fees. When the child was with the father the mother paid her child support. When the child was finally with the right parent somehow the father got away without having to pay one penny of child support. He had to be in control. Since he withheld all information regarding the child's welfare he put her in harms way. Mother took the child to the doctor when she got sick and was totally embarrassed she knew nothing regarding the medical information especially the allergies, The mother texted the father (from the doctors office) and he replied call his attorney. To me this doesn't seem like a concerned father. Seeing the child upset when she had to go back to the father. What upset me the most was finding out the child sleeps with him. Sometimes in the nude. Maybe I don't understand all the rules of the law but I thought this was also morally wrong. A concerned parent would allow the child to finish the school year. Say goodbye to her friends. It saddens me to know the child will not have contact with the sisters, aunts, uncles and the 87 year old grandfather. He didn't allow it before. Only the mother is allowed to talk to the child. I don't think now will be any different. I hope the decision the courts made would've been the same one if this was a member of their family. Someday this child will end up in therapy if allowed to remain with the father.

  3. Ok attorney Straw ... if that be a good idea ... And I am not saying it is ... but if it were ... would that be ripe prior to her suffering an embarrassing remand from the Seventh? Seems more than a tad premature here soldier. One putting on the armor should not boast liked one taking it off.

  4. The judge thinks that she is so cute to deny jurisdiction, but without jurisdiction, she loses her immunity. She did not give me any due process hearing or any discovery, like the Middlesex case provided for that lawyer. Because she has refused to protect me and she has no immunity because she rejected jurisdiction, I am now suing her in her district.

  5. Sam Bradbury was never a resident of Lafayette he lived in rural Tippecanoe County, Thats an error.

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