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Justices decline to take divorce case involving lump sum SSDI payment

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A divided Indiana Supreme Court will let stand the lower court ruling that affirmed a lump sum Social Security Disability Insurance payment was not an asset of marriage subject to division.

The justices declined June 19 to take on transfer John Luttrell v. Melinda Luttrell, 49A02-1301-DR-85. John Luttrell claimed the trial court improperly excluded Melinda Luttrell’s lump-sum Social Security Disability Insurance payment from the marital pot. The Court of Appeals, citing Severs v. Severs, 837 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. 2005), affirmed, writing “We … agree with Melinda that the broad statement by our supreme court that ‘any assignment or division of social security benefits to satisfy a marital property settlement under Indiana law is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 407,’ is not limited to a future income stream as at issue in that case, but also applies to the lump sum payment that Melinda received.”

In his dissent, in which Justice Loretta Rush joined, Justice Steven David wrote that the justices should take the case to provide guidance on the issue of whether a lump-sum SSDI payment is a marital asset subject to division upon divorce, or is a factor to be considered. He noted that the Supreme Court has never formally responded to the issue presented on transfer, as Severs dealt with a different issue involving SSDI.

“As it stands, the potential windfall for the spouse receiving the lump-sum SSDI payment is apparent, particularly where, under most circumstances, the lump sum represents lost income that was compensated for by a combination of the other spouse stepping up and both parties doing without during the period which gave rise to the SSDI qualification. Here, Melinda Luttrell’s lump-sum SSDI payment of $14,430.75 was not factored into the trial court’s division of the Luttrell marital estate, of which the net distribution of approximately $191,000 was split 60/40 in her favor. And in the next case where this issue arises, the lump-sum SSDI payment could be greater in amount and/or percent at stake. At minimum, one party’s receipt of a lump-sum SSDI payment should be a factor for the trial court to consider when awarding attorney’s fees,” David wrote.

The Court of Appeals also reversed the lower court’s ruling that excluded from property division the student loan liabilities of the Luttrells, who co-signed for their two children. The judges noted that there was little relevant caselaw regarding the disposition of contingent liability in divorce proceedings, but believed the loans should have been considered by the trial court.

The justices declined transfer to nine other cases for the week ending June 20. They granted transfer to Ralph Andrews v. Mor/Ryde International, Inc., 20S04-1406-PL-399, June 19 and issued a decision on the Indiana Sales Representative Act that same day.

The transfer list for the week ending June 20 is available on the court’s website.

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  1. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  2. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  3. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

  4. Why in the world would someone need a person to correct a transcript when a realtime court reporter could provide them with a transcript (rough draft) immediately?

  5. This article proved very enlightening. Right ahead of sitting the LSAT for the first time, I felt a sense of relief that a score of 141 was admitted to an Indiana Law School and did well under unique circumstances. While my GPA is currently 3.91 I fear standardized testing and hope that I too will get a good enough grade for acceptance here at home. Thanks so much for this informative post.

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