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Justices decline to take divorce case involving lump sum SSDI payment

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A divided Indiana Supreme Court will let stand the lower court ruling that affirmed a lump sum Social Security Disability Insurance payment was not an asset of marriage subject to division.

The justices declined June 19 to take on transfer John Luttrell v. Melinda Luttrell, 49A02-1301-DR-85. John Luttrell claimed the trial court improperly excluded Melinda Luttrell’s lump-sum Social Security Disability Insurance payment from the marital pot. The Court of Appeals, citing Severs v. Severs, 837 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. 2005), affirmed, writing “We … agree with Melinda that the broad statement by our supreme court that ‘any assignment or division of social security benefits to satisfy a marital property settlement under Indiana law is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 407,’ is not limited to a future income stream as at issue in that case, but also applies to the lump sum payment that Melinda received.”

In his dissent, in which Justice Loretta Rush joined, Justice Steven David wrote that the justices should take the case to provide guidance on the issue of whether a lump-sum SSDI payment is a marital asset subject to division upon divorce, or is a factor to be considered. He noted that the Supreme Court has never formally responded to the issue presented on transfer, as Severs dealt with a different issue involving SSDI.

“As it stands, the potential windfall for the spouse receiving the lump-sum SSDI payment is apparent, particularly where, under most circumstances, the lump sum represents lost income that was compensated for by a combination of the other spouse stepping up and both parties doing without during the period which gave rise to the SSDI qualification. Here, Melinda Luttrell’s lump-sum SSDI payment of $14,430.75 was not factored into the trial court’s division of the Luttrell marital estate, of which the net distribution of approximately $191,000 was split 60/40 in her favor. And in the next case where this issue arises, the lump-sum SSDI payment could be greater in amount and/or percent at stake. At minimum, one party’s receipt of a lump-sum SSDI payment should be a factor for the trial court to consider when awarding attorney’s fees,” David wrote.

The Court of Appeals also reversed the lower court’s ruling that excluded from property division the student loan liabilities of the Luttrells, who co-signed for their two children. The judges noted that there was little relevant caselaw regarding the disposition of contingent liability in divorce proceedings, but believed the loans should have been considered by the trial court.

The justices declined transfer to nine other cases for the week ending June 20. They granted transfer to Ralph Andrews v. Mor/Ryde International, Inc., 20S04-1406-PL-399, June 19 and issued a decision on the Indiana Sales Representative Act that same day.

The transfer list for the week ending June 20 is available on the court’s website.

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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