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Justices deny case involving trial judges issuing orders against other courts

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The Indiana Supreme Court will not take the lawsuit filed by six people against Marion Superior Judge William Young for his actions in traffic court. The plaintiffs wanted the special judge appointed to their case to order Young to comply with certain procedures, which included mandating Young allow the general public to attend court sessions.

Special Judge Matthew Hanson from Morgan County was appointed to hear the case, Toshiano Ishii, Matthew Stone, Greg Hardin, Lisa Hardin, et al. v. The Hon. William E. Young, Judge. The plaintiffs all claimed that Young treated them improperly while they were in traffic court and wanted Hanson to prohibit Young from improperly fining people, allow the general public to sit in on court, and allow defendants with health problems to be able to leave court and return and also carry food, water and medication, if needed.

Hanson dismissed the plaintiffs’ request, which the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed in December. The appellate court rejected the arguments that the Indiana Constitution and appellate and original action rules let trial judges issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition against another trial court judge relating to matters that aren’t connected to the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Indiana justices have the exclusive jurisdiction, the COA found, and that decision stands now that the Supreme Court has denied transfer.

Young was disciplined for his general handling of traffic infraction cases in November 2010, receiving a 30-day suspension from the Indiana Supreme Court. Young and the Indiana Judicial Qualifications Commission had reached a settlement in the matter, in which he was charged with misconduct based on allegations Young routinely implied that litigants shouldn’t demand trials and they would be penalized for doing so if they lost. He admitted to the commission that he imposed the higher fines on litigants whom he believed shouldn’t have pursued trials.

The plaintiffs in the Ishii case are not the basis for the disciplinary action, but their lawsuit involved similar conduct. The plaintiffs only sought relief for future cases.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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