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Justices differ on defining 'youth program center'

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Two Indiana Supreme Court justices objected to affirming a man’s drug sentence for possession within 1,000 feet of a “youth program center” because the church that ran the programs wasn’t easily identifiable as regularly running programs for kids.

Justices Theodore Boehm and Robert Rucker dissented from the majority in Walker Whatley v. State of Indiana, No. 49S02-0908-CR-379, because they didn’t believe a casual observer would know that the church ran youth-oriented programs. The dissenting justices agreed with the majority that there are many buildings that are easily identifiable as regular providers of programs or services for children.

“But the statute under the majority’s rationale here looks only to the activities conducted in the structure to determine whether it is a youth program center, and not to whether a casual observer could readily discern that the structure provides those services,” wrote Justice Boehm. “This reasoning would make a youth program center of every residence housing a Cub Scout weekly meeting.”


The majority held that it didn’t matter that the programs offered by Robinson Community Church were of religious content or that the church has other uses for the building. The statute doesn’t explicitly or implicitly place any limitations on the content of programs offered or why children are present, wrote Justice Frank Sullivan for the majority.

Walker Whatley was arrested in his home on a warrant in an unrelated case when police discovered he had a little over 3 grams of cocaine in his pocket. Because he lived nearly 800 feet from Robinson Community Church, the charge was elevated a Class A felony, of which he was convicted.

The Indiana Court of Appeals overturned his conviction on the grounds the church didn’t qualify as a “youth program center” under Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6 because its youth programs didn’t change its status as a church. They ordered that the conviction be entered as a Class C felony and that he be sentenced accordingly.

Whatley argued that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as it applies to him because there was nothing about the church, such as signage, indicating that it’s a protected area. But the majority found Whatley could have observed the church’s status by seeing young people enter and exit the building on a regular basis; he also could have asked if it offered youth programs on a regular basis. Just as was the case in Walker v. State, 668 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1996), it doesn’t matter that Whatley was unaware of the existence of the youth program center. The statute isn’t vague as applied to the facts of Whatley’s case, wrote Justice Sullivan.

But that’s one reason why Justices Boehm and Rucker dissented – the enhancement doesn’t list church or any other term that might more plainly include Robinson Community Church. Due process requires that a criminal statute give everyone reasonable notice of what is prohibited, Justice Boehm wrote. Justice Rucker concurred that Whatley’s enhanced sentence should be set aside.
 

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  1. He TIL team,please zap this comment too since it was merely marking a scammer and not reflecting on the story. Thanks, happy Monday, keep up the fine work.

  2. You just need my social security number sent to your Gmail account to process then loan, right? Beware scammers indeed.

  3. The appellate court just said doctors can be sued for reporting child abuse. The most dangerous form of child abuse with the highest mortality rate of any form of child abuse (between 6% and 9% according to the below listed studies). Now doctors will be far less likely to report this form of dangerous child abuse in Indiana. If you want to know what this is, google the names Lacey Spears, Julie Conley (and look at what happened when uninformed judges returned that child against medical advice), Hope Ybarra, and Dixie Blanchard. Here is some really good reporting on what this allegation was: http://media.star-telegram.com/Munchausenmoms/ Here are the two research papers: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0145213487900810 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0145213403000309 25% of sibling are dead in that second study. 25%!!! Unbelievable ruling. Chilling. Wrong.

  4. Mr. Levin says that the BMV engaged in misconduct--that the BMV (or, rather, someone in the BMV) knew Indiana motorists were being overcharged fees but did nothing to correct the situation. Such misconduct, whether engaged in by one individual or by a group, is called theft (defined as knowingly or intentionally exerting unauthorized control over the property of another person with the intent to deprive the other person of the property's value or use). Theft is a crime in Indiana (as it still is in most of the civilized world). One wonders, then, why there have been no criminal prosecutions of BMV officials for this theft? Government misconduct doesn't occur in a vacuum. An individual who works for or oversees a government agency is responsible for the misconduct. In this instance, somebody (or somebodies) with the BMV, at some time, knew Indiana motorists were being overcharged. What's more, this person (or these people), even after having the error of their ways pointed out to them, did nothing to fix the problem. Instead, the overcharges continued. Thus, the taxpayers of Indiana are also on the hook for the millions of dollars in attorneys fees (for both sides; the BMV didn't see fit to avail itself of the services of a lawyer employed by the state government) that had to be spent in order to finally convince the BMV that stealing money from Indiana motorists was a bad thing. Given that the BMV official(s) responsible for this crime continued their misconduct, covered it up, and never did anything until the agency reached an agreeable settlement, it seems the statute of limitations for prosecuting these folks has not yet run. I hope our Attorney General is paying attention to this fiasco and is seriously considering prosecution. Indiana, the state that works . . . for thieves.

  5. I'm glad that attorney Carl Hayes, who represented the BMV in this case, is able to say that his client "is pleased to have resolved the issue". Everyone makes mistakes, even bureaucratic behemoths like Indiana's BMV. So to some extent we need to be forgiving of such mistakes. But when those mistakes are going to cost Indiana taxpayers millions of dollars to rectify (because neither plaintiff's counsel nor Mr. Hayes gave freely of their services, and the BMV, being a state-funded agency, relies on taxpayer dollars to pay these attorneys their fees), the agency doesn't have a right to feel "pleased to have resolved the issue". One is left wondering why the BMV feels so pleased with this resolution? The magnitude of the agency's overcharges might suggest to some that, perhaps, these errors were more than mere oversight. Could this be why the agency is so "pleased" with this resolution? Will Indiana motorists ever be assured that the culture of incompetence (if not worse) that the BMV seems to have fostered is no longer the status quo? Or will even more "overcharges" and lawsuits result? It's fairly obvious who is really "pleased to have resolved the issue", and it's not Indiana's taxpayers who are on the hook for the legal fees generated in these cases.

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