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Justices find email is constitutionally protected speech

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A trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a fire chief and township in a firefighter’s suit following his termination by the chief for sending a personal, political email that the chief believed contained false statements of fact. The firefighter’s email was actually constitutionally protected speech, the Indiana Supreme Court held Thursday.

Bradley Love, a volunteer and part-time firefighter, responded on his personal email account to an email he received regarding the candidate he was supporting for Sugar Creek Township trustee. In the email sent to a few people, Love claimed the Sugar Creek Fire Department has given new sport utility vehicles to lieutenants and captains, and they drive them all over the state; the fire department doesn’t make runs after 4 p.m.; and other claims regarding the fire department.

Fire chief Robert Rehfus was forwarded the email and decided to fire Love because he claimed it contained false statements of fact. Rehfus was supporting a different candidate for trustee.

Love filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Rehfus, individually and in his official capacity, and against the Sugar Creek Township arguing his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed.

In Bradley J. Love v. Robert Rehfus, et al., No. 30S01-1004-CV-162, the justices reversed the trial court, finding that Love’s email had constitutional protections under the test set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and its progeny. There were no genuine issues of material fact as to the facts considered under the Pickering balance – that the public employee was speaking as a citizen and speaking on a matter of public concern – and Love’s speech was protected public-employee speech under the Garcetti-Connick-Pickering test, wrote Justice Frank Sullivan.

The defendants didn’t show that Love’s email had any potential to create difficulties maintaining discipline or loyalty or interfered with working relationships in the fire department. Also, nothing suggested that writing and sending the email interfered with Love’s ability to perform his job or the regular operation of the department. The email can’t be considered a personal attack on Rehfus because it doesn’t reference him by name or position, Justice Sullivan continued.

“The government was not justified in treating Love different from any other member of the general public,” he wrote.

Love argued that the township could be liable for Rehfus’ actions based on Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), because Rehfus had final policymaking authority for the township. The justices found summary judgment in favor of either party on Love’s claim of municipal liability under Section 1983 is inappropriate. An inquiry needs to be made as to whether Rehfus had final policymaking authority regarding the employment of part-time, volunteer firefighters, not whether he was the final policymaking authority with regard to all employment matters for the township or within the department.

The justices ordered on remand that the trial court determine who the final policymaker was, and if it wasn’t Rehfus, determine whether that official regulated to Rehfus the relevant final policymaking authority.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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