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Justices: law requires courts' reasons in sentencing

Michael W. Hoskins
January 1, 2007
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Trial courts must issue sentencing statements that include a detailed account of the judge's reasons for imposing penalties, such as aggravators and mitigators, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled today.

Additionally, the state's highest court has reiterated that it will only review a sentence on the grounds of abuse of discretion.

In a ruling that answers questions left open following the 2005 revision of state law regarding Indiana's sentencing structure, justices unanimously affirmed a Kosciusko Superior judge's decision in Alexander J. Anglemyer v. State of Indiana, 40S05-0606-CR-230.

"We hold that where a trial court imposes sentence for a felony offense, it is required to issue a sentencing statement that includes a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court's reasons for the sentence imposed," Justice Robert D. Rucker wrote. "The standard of review is abuse of discretion."

Two other decisions issued today tie into the Anglemyer sentencing ruling: Morris Windhorst v. State of Indiana, 49S04-0701-CR-32, and Aaron D. McDonald v. State of Indiana, 20S03-0706-CR-252

Justice Rucker wrote all three opinions, referring to the Anglemyer decision in the Windhorst and McDonald rulings.

These cases are the latest in a growing line of litigation stemming from the United States Supreme Court's landmark 2004 ruling in Blakely v. Washington, which held that nation's sentencing structure was unconstitutional and that juries - not judges - must hear evidence before sentences can be enhanced. Indiana adopted in 2005 a similar ruling in Smylie v. State, and the legislature soon revised the law.

A portion of the law that courts have disagreed on involves the phrase, "If the court finds aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances," then a statement with reasons for that penalty should be imposed.

In the aftermath, the Indiana Court of Appeals has been divided on whether and to what extent trial judges are now required to make sentencing statements explaining their penalty decisions, and whether any such statements must include findings of aggravating and mitigating factors. A closely related issue has also been the scope and role of appellate review.

"This language suggests a legislative acknowledgment that a sentencing statement identifying aggravators and mitigators retains its status as an integral part of the trial court's sentencing procedure," Justice Rucker wrote in Anglemyer, noting that judges are only prohibited from finding aggravators and enhancing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum.

This case comes from Anglemyer's May 2005 arrest for beating and robbing a pizza delivery driver, and the subsequent plea agreement dictating a 16-year consecutive sentence - 10 years for the robbery and six years for battery. Anglemyer appealed on the issue of whether the maximum possible sentence imposed was inappropriate and the trial court erred in identifying and weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

After outlining the background and history of the sentencing scheme and flood of caselaw in recent years, the justices affirmed.

The court wrote that only abuse of discretion will warrant appellate review of a sentence and outlined possible ways for that abuse to happen.

Specifically, Justice Rucker wrote the process for what the appellate review of sentences should be: trial court's entering a statement that can be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion, the relative weight or value of reasons found is not subject to review, and merits of a sentence can be sought elsewhere on grounds outlined in appellate rules.

"The real concern was that everything was up in the air on how you review sentences," said Indianapolis attorney Michael Limrick, who has closely been following this and related cases. "But this lays out the process and offers clarity and guidance. This is clear as can be and will be helpful to practicing attorneys."

This decision from Indiana's highest jurists comes on the heels of a ruling Thursday by the Supreme Court of the United States in Rita v. United States, which held by an 8-1 margin that a federal court of appeals may treat a sentence within the guideline range as presumptively reasonable when evaluating District Court rulings.
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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

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  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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