Justices rule on applicable statute of limitations

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The Indiana Supreme Court decided Thursday that the period within the general statute of limitations controls the limitation period when a medical provider may seek payment of outstanding bills for authorized treatment to an employer’s worker. The justices came to that conclusion after finding the Worker’s Compensation Act is silent on what the applicable limitation period is for this matter.

Pilot Travel Center’s employee Anthony Wetnight was injured at work in August 2003 and Pilot authorized Wetnight to receive medical treatment from Indiana Spine Group in July and October 2004. Pilot only made partial payments to the balance of Wetnight’s treatment, with the last payment coming in June 2008. ISG sought payment of the remaining balance in June 2009 by filing an application for adjustment of claim for provider’s fee with the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Board. Pilot argued that ISG filed the claim outside the statute of limitations in Indiana Code 22-3-3-27 listed under the Worker’s Compensation Act, and that it had to file the application within two years after the date Pilot last paid Wetnight compensation.

The full Worker’s Compensation Board affirmed the decision to dismiss ISG’s application. ISG appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, finding neither I.C. 22-3-3-3 or -27 in the Worker’s Compensation Act applied.

In Indiana Spine Group, PC v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC, 93S02-1102-EX-90, the justices reversed the board’s decision, holding that I.C. 22-3-3-3 and -27 do not apply and therefore don’t bar ISG’s claim. Nothing in the Worker’s Compensation Act indicates that the time limitation on a health care provider’s claim for unpaid bills is connected to the time limitation on an employee’s claim for compensation, wrote Justice Robert Rucker. Section 27’s limitation is for modification of awards due to a “change in conditions,” and the two-year period begins to run on the last day for which compensation is paid to an injured employee. However, in the instant case, there are not changed conditions requiring modification to Wetnight’s award.

“The issue presented in ISG’s Application is the pecuniary liability of ISG and not whether the bills must be paid at all,” wrote Rucker. “Further, we agree with the observations from the Court of Appeals that the application of section 22-3-3-27 in ‘this context could lead to absurd results.’”

The justices found ISG’s claim to be timely under I.C. 34-11-1-2, the general statute of limitation, which says a cause of action that isn’t limited by another statute must be brought within 10 years. They remanded the cause for further proceedings. Based on their decision Thursday, Rucker noted that the justices have denied the pending transfer petitions of five other cases involving similar issues with ISG as a party.  


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  1. This new language about a warning has not been discussed at previous meetings. It's not available online. Since it must be made public knowledge before the vote, does anyone know exactly what it says? Further, this proposal was held up for 5 weeks because members Carol and Lucy insisted that all terms used be defined. So now, definitions are unnecessary and have not been inserted? Beyond these requirements, what is the logic behind giving one free pass to discriminators? Is that how laws work - break it once and that's ok? Just don't do it again? Three members of Carmel's council have done just about everything they can think of to prohibit an anti-discrimination ordinance in Carmel, much to Brainard's consternation, I'm told. These three 'want to be so careful' that they have failed to do what at least 13 other communities, including Martinsville, have already done. It's not being careful. It's standing in the way of what 60% of Carmel residents want. It's hurting CArmel in thT businesses have refused to locate because the council has not gotten with the program. And now they want to give discriminatory one free shot to do so. Unacceptable. Once three members leave the council because they lost their races, the Carmel council will have unanimous approval of the ordinance as originally drafted, not with a one free shot to discriminate freebie. That happens in January 2016. Why give a freebie when all we have to do is wait 3 months and get an ordinance with teeth from Day 1? If nothing else, can you please get s copy from Carmel and post it so we can see what else has changed in the proposal?

  2. Here is an interesting 2012 law review article for any who wish to dive deeper into this subject matter: Excerpt: "Judicial interpretation of the ADA has extended public entity liability to licensing agencies in the licensure and certification of attorneys.49 State bar examiners have the authority to conduct fitness investigations for the purpose of determining whether an applicant is a direct threat to the public.50 A “direct threat” is defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services as provided by § 35.139.”51 However, bar examiners may not utilize generalizations or stereotypes about the applicant’s disability in concluding that an applicant is a direct threat.52"

  3. We have been on the waiting list since 2009, i was notified almost 4 months ago that we were going to start receiving payments and we still have received nothing. Every time I call I'm told I just have to wait it's in the lawyers hands. Is everyone else still waiting?

  4. I hope you dont mind but to answer my question. What amendment does this case pretain to?

  5. Research by William J Federer Chief Justice John Marshall commented May 9, 1833, on the pamphlet The Relation of Christianity to Civil Government in the United States written by Rev. Jasper Adams, President of the College of Charleston, South Carolina (The Papers of John Marshall, ed. Charles Hobson, Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2006, p, 278): "Reverend Sir, I am much indebted to you for the copy of your valuable sermon on the relation of Christianity to civil government preached before the convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Charleston, on the 13th of February last. I have read it with great attention and advantage. The documents annexed to the sermon certainly go far in sustaining the proposition which it is your purpose to establish. One great object of the colonial charters was avowedly the propagation of the Christian faith. Means have been employed to accomplish this object, and those means have been used by government..." John Marshall continued: "No person, I believe, questions the importance of religion to the happiness of man even during his existence in this world. It has at all times employed his most serious meditation, and had a decided influence on his conduct. The American population is entirely Christian, and with us, Christianity and Religion are identified. It would be strange, indeed, if with such a people, our institutions did not presuppose Christianity, and did not often refer to it, and exhibit relations with it. Legislation on the subject is admitted to require great delicacy, because freedom of conscience and respect for our religion both claim our most serious regard. You have allowed their full influence to both. With very great respect, I am Sir, your Obedt., J. Marshall."