ILNews

Justices rule on cases using 3-step test seeking records

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Supreme Court tackled the issue of requests for production of information to private third parties in two opinions Thursday – one dealing with records sought that fall under the victim-advocate privilege and the other dealing with unprotected information.

Crisis Connection, Inc. v. Ronald K. Fromme, No. 19S05-1012-CR-678, and Lamar M. Crawford v. State of Indiana, No., 49S05-1106-CR-370, both involved the three-step test used to determine the discoverability of information in criminal cases – particularity, relevance or materiality, and paramount interest.

In Crisis Connection, Ronald Fromme sought the counseling records from nonprofit Crisis Connection of two girls and their mother for use in his defense against child molesting charges. Crisis Connection argued those records are protected under the state’s victim-advocate privilege. The trial court ordered the records delivered to the court for an in camera review. On interlocutory appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed using the three-step test, holding that the privacy interest was important, but not strong enough to bar an in camera review of the records.

In Crawford, Lamar Crawford sought information recorded by Lucky Shift during the production of “The Shift,” a television show that followed Indianapolis Metropolitan Police homicide detectives. Crawford was accused of a murder that was the subject of a show that aired. The trial court ordered some information be disclosed for an in camera review, but denied three of Crawford’s requests because they weren’t particular enough. Using the three-step test, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed that those three requests weren’t sufficiently particular.

The justices found the COA erred in using the three-step test in Crisis Connection because the records Fromme sought are privileged information, and caselaw makes clear that the test only applies to discover nonprivileged information. The Indiana Legislature has expressly provided that the victim-advocate privilege applies in cases like this one to prohibit any disclosure, wrote Justice Frank Sullivan.

The high court went on to find that Fromme does not have a constitutional right to an in camera review of Crisis Connection’s records, frequently citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). Indiana courts do not extend Confrontation Clause rights to pretrial settings, so as long as the trial court does not improperly prevent Fromme from cross-examining the alleged victims at trial, his rights under the Confrontation Clause won’t be violated, wrote the justice.

The justices emphasized the importance of the promise of confidentiality between a provider and a patient. If patients knew their records could be subject to even an in camera review, confidential conversations would surely be chilled, wrote Justice Sullivan.

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings.

In Crawford, the three-step test does apply because the information Crawford seeks isn’t privileged. The justices focused on two requests denied by the trial court: Request #18 – Footage of any and all statements of officers, agents, or affiliates of Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department or any reenactment thereof; and Request #19 – Footage of anyone interviewed or questioned, or any reenactment thereof, in connection with the investigation of the death of Gernell Jackson.

In each of the challenged requests, Crawford doesn’t state with reasonable particularity what footage or statements or interviews he seeks, he is just fishing for it, wrote Justice Sullivan. The justices couldn’t say that the trial court abused its discretion in quashing these discovery requests.
 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

ADVERTISEMENT