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Justices split on transfer of noncompete case

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Two Indiana Supreme Court justices disagreed with their colleagues in not accepting an appeal, finding that a ruling from the state's intermediate appellate court muddled caselaw on medical business and noncompete agreements, and significantly jeopardizes the public's access to medical care.

In a seven-page dissent authored by Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard and joined by Justice Brent Dickson, the two jurists get into why they would have granted transfer in the case of Mercho-Roushdi-Shoemaker-Dilley Thoraco-Vascular Corp. (MRSD) v. James W. Blatchford, III, M.D., and Eve G. Cieutat, No. 84A01-0801-CV-30.

The Feb. 5, 2009, Court of Appeals decision involves the enforceability of a noncompete agreement between doctors and a physicians' group, and this transfer denial keeps in place that holding that could significantly impact Indiana's medical community.

Originating from Vigo Superior No.1, the case goes back more than a decade and involves a group of open-heart surgeons in Indianapolis and Terre Haute who recruited a husband-wife team from Texas to provide more staff capacity at one location. All parties negotiated agreements covering multiple aspects of their business relationship, from stock purchasing to dissolution procedures and noncompete provisions. When the Texas doctors decided several years later to set up a competing practice of their own in Terre Haute, they and their former associates sued each other.

That first round of litigation went to the Court of Appeals, which in 2001 affirmed a trial judge's denial of injunctive relief for the Indiana-based physicians on grounds that an adequate remedy existed at law. But a second round of litigation ensued, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling and held that the noncompete agreements weren't enforceable. In its decision from earlier this year, the three-judge panel unanimously held that enforcing the physicians' business agreements in this case is harmful to patients and contrary to public policy. Specifically, it affirmed solely based on the public interest prong of noncompetition agreement evaluation.

Deciding on the issue during its weekly conference Dec. 17, three justices agreed with the appellate panel's decision and voted not to accept the case. But Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Dickson disagreed with their colleagues.

The chief justice found issues with how James Blatchford and Eve Cieutat had no Indiana connections yet raised arguments that "people would die without (them) practicing in Terre Haute, that it would be very difficult to recruit doctors with their level of training to the area, and that there would be a shortage of capable doctors if they left." The two doctors have since left the state to practice elsewhere.

The chief justice wrote that the physicians group MRSD, and others in similar situations, likely wouldn't have recruited the Texas doctors or any others from outside Indiana if noncompete agreements weren't an option.

"While it is appropriate to treat employment agreements involving doctors with special care, failure to enforce at law the business agreements among doctors will mean fewer doctors available to patients, not more," he wrote, adding later that the Court of Appeals decision "muddles the caselaw of the medical business."

"This case illustrates why non-enforcement of such agreements has the potential to detract from the public interest. Denying damages to a practice seeking to enforce its business arrangements detracts from the very public interests that this Court's decisions aim to protect - patient access to medical care," Chief Justice Shepard wrote. "I think the patients (and doctors) would be well served by vacating the Court of Appeals' declaration that business arrangements between physicians are not enforceable."

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  1. Living in South Bend, I travel to Michigan a lot. Virtually every gas station sells cold beer there. Many sell the hard stuff too. Doesn't seem to be a big deal there.

  2. Mr. Ricker, how foolish of you to think that by complying with the law you would be ok. Don't you know that Indiana is a state that welcomes monopolies, and that Indiana's legislature is the one entity in this state that believes monopolistic practices (such as those engaged in by Indiana Association of Beverage Retailers) make Indiana a "business-friendly" state? How can you not see this????

  3. Actually, and most strikingly, the ruling failed to address the central issue to the whole case: Namely, Black Knight/LPS, who was NEVER a party to the State court litigation, and who is under a 2013 consent judgment in Indiana (where it has stipulated to the forgery of loan documents, the ones specifically at issue in my case)never disclosed itself in State court or remediated the forged loan documents as was REQUIRED of them by the CJ. In essence, what the court is willfully ignoring, is that it is setting a precedent that the supplier of a defective product, one whom is under a consent judgment stipulating to such, and under obligation to remediate said defective product, can: 1.) Ignore the CJ 2.) Allow counsel to commit fraud on the state court 3.) Then try to hide behind Rooker Feldman doctrine as a bar to being held culpable in federal court. The problem here is the court is in direct conflict with its own ruling(s) in Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings & Iqbal- 780 F.3d 728, at 730 “What Johnson adds - what the defendants in this suit have failed to appreciate—is that federal courts retain jurisdiction to award damages for fraud that imposes extrajudicial injury. The Supreme Court drew that very line in Exxon Mobil ... Iqbal alleges that the defendants conducted a racketeering enterprise that predates the state court’s judgments ...but Exxon Mobil shows that the Rooker Feldman doctrine asks what injury the plaintiff asks the federal court to redress, not whether the injury is “intertwined” with something else …Because Iqbal seeks damages for activity that (he alleges) predates the state litigation and caused injury independently of it, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not block this suit. It must be reinstated.” So, as I already noted to others, I now have the chance to bring my case to SCOTUS; the ruling by Wood & Posner is flawed on numerous levels,BUT most troubling is the fact that the authors KNOW it's a flawed ruling and choose to ignore the flaws for one simple reason: The courts have decided to agree with former AG Eric Holder that national banks "Are too big to fail" and must win at any cost-even that of due process, case precedent, & the truth....Let's see if SCOTUS wants a bite at the apple.

  4. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

  5. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

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