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Justices take 4 cases

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The Indiana Supreme Court accepted four cases on transfer last week, which included a decision on a first impression issue on whether third-party carriers are included in the statute regarding filing proposed medical malpractice complaints.


The justices took for the week ending March 14:
•    Frank Jacobs v. State of Indiana, 49S04-1403-CR-162. The Indiana Court of Appeals vacated Frank Jacobs’ conviction of Class B felony criminal confinement due to a double jeopardy violation. The judges ruled his conviction of confinement was based on the same behavior that was used to convict him of Class B felony criminal deviate conduct – that he forcibly performed oral sex on a minor boy.
•    State of Indiana v. Adrian Lotaki, 32S01-1403-CR-151. In this not-for-publication decision, the Indiana Court of Appeals dismissed the state’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of its motion to correct erroneous sentence after ruling the state isn’t authorized to bring the appeal.
•    Eric William Stahl v. State of Indiana, 45S04-1403-PC-163. The justices vacated the Sept. 30 order dismissing the appeal and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
 

On March 10 the justices granted transfer and issued their opinion in Bonnie Moryl, as Surviving Spouse and Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard A. Moryl, Deceased v. Carey B. Ransone, M.D., La Porte Hospital, Dawn Forney, RN, Wanda Wakeman, RN BSBA, B. Prast, RN, and Carol Cutter, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Insurance, 46S04-1403-CT-149. Bonnie Moryl argued that her proposed medical malpractice complaint stemming from the death of her husband on April 20, 2007, which she sent to the DOI on April 19, 2009, via FedEx, should be considered timely filed even though the department did not receive it and file stamp it until April 21. The defendants sought summary judgment, claiming the complaint was filed outside of the two-year statute of limitations, which the LaPorte Superior Court granted.

The justices ruled the complaint was timely filed.

The justices denied transfer to 24 cases. The complete list of cases is available online.

 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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