ILNews

Lawmakers discuss scope of police entry case

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

A Bedford lawyer-legislator says a recent Indiana Supreme Court decision on resisting police entry has resulted in more feedback from attorneys and residents statewide than he’s experienced since the daylight saving time debate.

That comment set the stage for the first legislative subcommittee meeting June 29 aimed at exploring the court’s split decision May 12 in Barnes v. State, No. 82S05-1007-CR-343.

The justices' 3-2 ruling went further than any before on the issue of resisting police entry into a person’s home and held that Indiana no longer recognizes a common law right to resist in any situation. That decision fueled widespread outrage and critics say it goes too far and conflicts with both the Fourth Amendment and the state’s self-defense statute.

Though both sides have filed briefs requesting and supporting a rehearing, the Legislative Council created a four-person subcommittee to study this issue more in-depth.

Sen., Brent Steele, R-Bedford, who chairs the subcommittee, said he isn’t sure if the panel should wait on discussing and deciding this issue until the Supreme Court decides whether it’ll rehear the case.

“I think it’s incumbent upon us to do something legislatively,” he said at the meeting. “How often have lawyers seen the court say that the legislature didn’t address something? We run the risk of looking like we’ve abrogated our duties and that we decided not to deal with it immediately.”

Aside from Steele, Sen. Tim Lanane (D-Anderson) and Rep. Eric Turner (R-Cicero) were at the first meeting. Rep. Linda Lawson, (D-Hammond) did not attend. They passed out briefs filed in the case, as well as the justices’ ruling for everyone to review.

Lanane discussed his view of what the majority was saying – that any resistance can lead to an escalation of violence – and he wondered what the answer might be if any action is allowed by residents.

Lt. Mark Carnell, legal counsel for the Indiana State Police, said the ruling has had no impact on the agency's procedures and police don’t see it as giving officers any greater right to enter homes. Sen. Mike Young, R-Indianapolis, who is not a member of the subcommittee but attended the meeting to criticize the ruling, said he’d prefer police to hold off and wait when a situation is unclear.

Although the 11-page ruling states the court was deciding "the question of whether Indiana should recognize the common-law right to reasonably resist unlawful entry by police officers," Steele and others question whether it also impacts Indiana statute delving into this issue. One statute is the 2006 “castle doctrine” that broadened state residents’ right to protect themselves from unlawful entries into their homes.

Legislative Services Agency attorney Andrew Hedges told the subcommittee members that the ruling could be interpreted to impact only common law or also the statues, but it’s not clear. He described the structure of the opinion as a possible “drafting error” because it switches from addressing the common law aspect to even broader wording about the general right to resist police entry, and that it's unclear about the scope of the ruling. Hedges said the court could have included a footnote addressing the statute, but didn’t and so court watchers are left wondering whether the justices forgot about that statutory impact or if they ignored it to only address the common law question. He questioned Justice David’s use of “in sum” when issuing the holding, and whether that means the holding is limited to common law or also abrogates any statutory right to resist.

Steele sees that as a problem that needs legislative attention.

“I see this as two trains headed toward each other on the same track that will collide someday,” he said, in reference to the Supreme Court ruling and the self-defense statute revised five years ago.

A date for the second meeting hasn’t been set, but the three members at the first meeting indicated that August might be the next time they can gather. This subcommittee’s role would simply be to recommend any legislative changes to the full General Assembly once it reconvenes for the 2011-12 session.

Meanwhile, the briefing period is finished and the Supreme Court is now deciding whether it will revisit the case. The justices have no timetable in making that decision and could hold additional arguments, request more material, or rule based on the briefs and past record in the appeal.

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

ADVERTISEMENT