ILNews

Lawyer failed to deny note execution under oath

Back to TopE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Because an attorney acting pro se in a mortgage suit didn't include a statement in his general denial that the denial was truthful and made under penalty for perjury, he failed to deny under oath the execution of the note, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled today.

In Brian B. Baldwin v. Tippecanoe Land & Cattle Co., No. 55A01-0902-CV-52, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Tippecanoe Land & Cattle Co. in its claim to foreclose its second mortgage held by Baldwin.

Tippecanoe submitted the secured installment promissory note that was not signed, and a real estate second mortgage that appeared to be signed by Baldwin. Baldwin filed a one-sentence answer entering a general denial. His answer was signed and listed his attorney number, but didn't contain an oath.

The day before the hearing, Baldwin filed a verified response arguing the second mortgage was unenforceable because the note wasn't signed nor attached to the second mortgage.

Taken collectively, Indiana Trial Rules 8(B), 9.2(B), and 11(A) mean that an attorney's signature on a general denial rejects the assertion of the claim, but doesn't constitute an oath by which the pleader denies the execution of an instrument attached to a claim, wrote Judge Patricia Riley. Execution of the note and second mortgage would be deemed established under Indiana Trial Rule 9.2(B) unless Baldwin denied under oath that they were executed.

He didn't include a statement that his general denial was truthful and made under penalty for perjury, so he failed to deny under oath the execution of the note, she wrote.

ADVERTISEMENT

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

  4. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  5. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

ADVERTISEMENT