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Man’s prior conviction doesn’t render him a career offender

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The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the denial of a man’s habeas petition, finding his conviction of arson in the third degree in Delaware doesn’t qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. Section 4B.1. As such, his current sentence should be reduced to reflect he isn’t a career offender.

Royce Brown was convicted in Delaware of one count each of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm by a felon in 1996 and classified as a career offender based in part on his prior arson conviction. Now incarcerated in Indiana, Brown filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 contending that under Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), that conviction doesn’t qualify as a crime of violence under Section 4B1.1. The District Court dismissed the petition sua sponte because “the savings clause embodied in 2255(e) requires a claim of actual innocence directed to the underlying conviction, not merely the sentence.”

The 7th Circuit found that the District judge erred in concluding that challenges to a sentence are categorically barred under Section 2241. Brown is entitled to relief under that section because under Begay, his arson in the third degree conviction under Delaware law doesn’t qualify as “generic” arson under the enumerated crimes clause of the career offender guideline, nor is it covered by the residual clause, Judge Joel Flaum wrote in Royce Brown v. John F. Caraway, Warden, 12-1439.

The judges ruled that provided other (In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998)) conditions are present, a petitioner may utilize the savings clause to challenge the misapplication of the career offender guideline, at least where the defendant was sentenced in the pre-Booker era (543 U.S. 220 (2005)).

The judges sent the case back to the District Court to reduce Brown’s 360-month sentence.

Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook, who did not sit on the panel deciding this case, wrote separately that the 7th Circuit’s holding that combines Davenport with Navarez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011), “puts us in conflict with at least two circuits, as the panel acknowledges, with no other circuit on our side” in that the savings clause of Section 2255(e) doesn’t permit a prisoner to bring in Section 2241 petition a guidelines miscalculation claim that is barred from being presented in a Section 2255 motion.

“Notwithstanding what I have said, Davenport and Narvaez enjoy support in this circuit. I appear to be the only judge who doubts their soundness. It would therefore be pointless to sit en banc. Resolution of the conflict belongs to Congress or the Supreme Court. That is why I did not call for a hearing en banc following the panel’s circulation under Circuit Rule 40(e),” he wrote.

 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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