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Marion Superior traffic judge charged with misconduct

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A Marion Superior judge presiding over the county’s traffic court faces four judicial misconduct charges as a result of his general handling of traffic infraction cases and one suit in particular, where the state justices have described him as being “biased.”

In a seven-page charging document issued today, the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications formally outlined the misconduct allegations against Marion Superior Judge William E. Young, who’s been publicly criticized, sued, and even reversed by the state justices for his handling of traffic court cases that have come before him since January 2009.

The commission alleges he “engaged in a practice of imposing substantially higher penalties against traffic court litigants who chose to have trials and lost,” and the commission also alleges that Judge Young “routinely made statements implying that litigants should not demand trials and would be penalized for doing so if they lost.”

Specifically, the commission detailed the judge’s alleged misconduct in the 2009 case of Christian Hollinsworth, who police pulled over in August 2007 for speeding. The case ultimately went to a bench trial last year before Judge Young.

Just before the trial started, Hollinsworth’s attorney asked for a brief recess to "sign off" on a plea agreement but no agreement was reached. The lawyer asked for a continuance, and Judge Young denied that and then wouldn't allow a plea after Hollinsworth informed the court she would accept one and didn't want to proceed to trial.

Court records show that Judge Young "exhibited impatience" during trial by citing the time and his "full afternoon" docket when talking to Hollinsworth about a plea agreement, then told her, "I don't know if I want to take your plea. I'd rather just go to trial, I think. I don't like being jerked around at all, all right?" At sentencing, Judge Young noted that Hollinsworth had other pending charges on theft and battery and her attorney said those were alleged charges, to which the judge responded, "Sure they are."

Hollinsworth received a year in county jail and her driving privileges were suspended for an additional 365 days. The judge also found her to be indigent, and didn't impose any additional fines or penalties on the speeding conviction.

According to the Judicial Qualifications allegations, the judge “exhibited impatience and frustration” with Hollinsworth and her attorney, and made “sarcastic remarks” while insisting that the trial move forward despite the litigant’s objection.

The Indiana Supreme Court reversed that conviction on June 3 and ordered a new trial in the case of Hollinsworth v. State, No. 49S02-1006-CR-286, pointing specifically to Judge Young’s behavior that violated three judicial conduct canons requiring impartiality, patience, unbiased behavior, and recusal if a judge’s impartiality might be questioned.

“The trial court’s behavior in this case did not meet these standards,” the justices wrote.

While that ruling indicated that Judge Young fell short of meeting the conduct standards, it didn’t go into any potential disciplinary matters and left that up to the Judicial Qualifications Commission to review.

Now, the commission is charging Judge Young with four counts:

Count I is that he violated Rule 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, requiring judges to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to maintain high standards of conduct; violated Rule 2.2 which requires judges to perform their duties fairly and impartially; violated Rule 2.3(A) requiring judges to perform their duties without bias or prejudice; violated Rule 2.8(B) that requires judges to be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants and lawyers; violated Rule 2.11(A) that mandates that a judge disqualify himself when the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party; and overall that Judge Young committed conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Count II centers on the judge’s general sentencing practice of imposing increased penalties against traffic infraction litigants for exercising their rights to trial. By engaging in that pattern of conduct, the judge allegedly violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, and 2.2 – requiring judges to comply with the law and prohibiting them from conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Count III mirrors the above charge on the increased fines, but specifically focuses on that general practice after trials on traffic infraction cases.

Count IV charges that in 2009 Judge Young routinely attempted to coerce traffic court litigants into admitting infractions through his advisements, comments, projections about potential evidence, and misstatements about the burden of proof. The commission alleges that by doing so Judge Young violated Rules 1.2, 2.2, and 2.6(B), requiring judges to not act in a manner that coerces any party into settlement, and committed conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Judge Young now has 20 days to respond to the charges, but that answer is not mandatory. Following that, the Supreme Court will appoint three special masters to conduct a public hearing on the disciplinary charges, and the masters will then issue a report for the justices’ consideration. If the case isn’t settled at any point, the Supreme Court can dismiss the charges or impose sanctions ranging from a private or public reprimand to a permanent ban on holding judicial office in Indiana.

Aside from this disciplinary matter, Judge Young – who’s been on the bench since January 2001 -- also faces pending questions in other cases resulting from his behavior on the traffic court bench during the past 17 months. A class action case, Toshinao Ishii, et. al. v. Marion Superior 13, the Hon. William E. Young, Judge, and the City of Indianapolis, No. 49D11-0912-PL-55538, accuses the judge of instituting fine and access policies that undermine confidence in the judiciary's integrity and impartiality, and are highly prejudicial to litigants. It’s pending in county court, and the justices in May appointed a special judge to hear the case.
 

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  1. Such things are no more elections than those in the late, unlamented Soviet Union.

  2. It appears the police and prosecutors are allowed to change the rules halfway through the game to suit themselves. I am surprised that the congress has not yet eliminated the right to a trial in cases involving any type of forensic evidence. That would suit their foolish law and order police state views. I say we eliminate the statute of limitations for crimes committed by members of congress and other government employees. Of course they would never do that. They are all corrupt cowards!!!

  3. Poor Judge Brown probably thought that by slavishly serving the godz of the age her violations of 18th century concepts like due process and the rule of law would be overlooked. Mayhaps she was merely a Judge ahead of her time?

  4. in a lawyer discipline case Judge Brown, now removed, was presiding over a hearing about a lawyer accused of the supposedly heinous ethical violation of saying the words "Illegal immigrant." (IN re Barker) http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-discipline-2013-55S00-1008-DI-429.pdf .... I wonder if when we compare the egregious violations of due process by Judge Brown, to her chiding of another lawyer for politically incorrectness, if there are any conclusions to be drawn about what kind of person, what kind of judge, what kind of apparatchik, is busy implementing the agenda of political correctness and making off-limits legit advocacy about an adverse party in a suit whose illegal alien status is relevant? I am just asking the question, the reader can make own conclsuion. Oh wait-- did I use the wrong adjective-- let me rephrase that, um undocumented alien?

  5. of course the bigger questions of whether or not the people want to pay for ANY bussing is off limits, due to the Supreme Court protecting the people from DEMOCRACY. Several decades hence from desegregation and bussing plans and we STILL need to be taking all this taxpayer money to combat mostly-imagined "discrimination" in the most obviously failed social program of the postwar period.

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